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At the beginning of the Roberts Court, this Article considers three
dimensions of the Rehnquist Court's most famous precedent, examining the
precedent's potential for influencing the development of the law along each
of these dimensions. First, to what extent will the Equal Protection holding
of the Court's opinion in Bush v. Gore generate a new domain of
meritorious Equal Protection challenges to voting inequalities? Second, to
what extent will the Supreme Court's willingness to stop the Florida
recount in 2000 result in greater judicial intervention into voting
procedures while they are underway? And third, to what extent will the
intense media and academic criticism of Bush v. Gore affect the Court's
role in constitutional cases generally?
The Article will devote more space to the first of these questions, because
elections in 2004 and 2006 revealed a myriad offact patterns that generate
potentially meritorious claims requiring detailed substantive analysis of the
Equal Protection precedent. Even so, the Article's answer to the second
question (also based on insights from voting-related litigation in 2004 and
2006)-that Bush v. Gore discourages judicial intervention into the voting
process-is significant, because it corrects a misreading by many eager
litigants of the signal sent by the Court. And as for the case's long-term
implications for constitutional law generally, they are likely to be minimal,
because the reason for the case 's extreme notoriety (its role in identifying
the winning presidential candidate) is likely to be its least important
attribute over time.
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I. INTRODUCTIONt
As the Supreme Court transitions from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Chief
Justice Roberts, and from Justice O'Connor to Justice Alito, it is worth
speculating about the future of Bush v. Gore.' This speculation is of a piece
with prognostications about the fate of any important Rehnquist Court
precedent during the tenure of the new Roberts Court, especially those
decided by 5-4 votes. Consider Grutter v. Bollinger,2 the affirmative action
case involving the University of Michigan Law School: will Justice
O'Connor's opinion for the Court survive even for the twenty-five years she
set as time for taking another look at the issue? 3 Likewise, in an adjacent
field of election law-the regulation of campaign finance-will McConnell
v. Federal Election Commission,4 the monumental decision upholding core
provisions of the McCain-Feingold reform law, last even another year, when
Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life (currently before the
Court5) threatens to undermine one of those core provisions? 6
Any of these inquiries couples two considerations: first, the general
disposition of the Roberts Court to the doctrine of stare decisis, a topic of
much attention in the Roberts and Alito confirmation hearings, as well as
t [Editor's Note: The writing of this Article was completed in the spring of 2007,
prior to the oral arguments and decisions of numerous cases referenced in the
Introduction and discussion of cases implicating the principles of Bush v. Gore.]
1 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
3 Id. at 343. Presumably, the Court's current consideration of race-conscious student
assignment plans in K-12 education will not result in an outright overruling of Grutter,
but it could sharply limit its scope and force, leading to its earlier-than-expected demise.
See Dahlia Lithwick, Affirmative Inaction: Anthony Kennedy is Sort of Horrified by
Voluntary School Desegregation, SLATE, Dec. 4, 2006, http://www.slate.com/
id/2154853/ (discussing the oral argument in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education).
4 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
5 127 S. Ct. 1145 (2007) (granting plenary review to Wisconsin Right to Life v. FEC,
466 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D.D.C. 2006)).
6 The case concerns the "electioneering communication" provision of the McCain-
Feingold law. In McConnell, the Court rejected a facial challenge to that provision. If in
Wisconsin Right to Life the Court sustains the as-applied challenge, and subsequently it
proves too difficult to distinguish between permissible and impermissible applications of
the provision, then five votes may develop to invalidate the statute in its entirety, thereby
overruling this portion of McConnell.
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recent scholarly attention; 7 and second, particular features of each precedent
that might make it more or less susceptible to overruling, curtailment, or-
just the opposite--expansion. McConnell, for example, suffers from the
vulnerability that three sitting Justices are dead set against it,8 at least with
respect to one important aspect of the decision, and thus the respect for
precedent that stare decisis requires is insufficient to overcome the obligation
these Justices feel to rid First Amendment jurisprudence of what they
perceive to be an especially egregious 'anathema. Even if Chief Justice
Roberts and'Justice Alito do not share this view, they could undermine the
workability of McConnell in the pending Wisconsin Right to Life case, and
subsequently go along with overruling McConnell on grounds of
unworkability (a fate that similarly befell National League of Cities9 in
Garcia'0 after being subjected to an intractable line-drawing morass).
Bush v. Gore, however, is very different from McConnell with respect to
the question of its ongoing status as a precedent in the era of the Roberts
Court. For one thing, unlike McConnell--or Grutter, for that matter-Bush
v. Gore was not a case in which Justice O'Connor joined the so-called liberal
wing of the Court (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer), and therefore
replacing her with Justice Alito does not automatically suggest the
precedent's vulnerability. Moreover, identifying the precedent of Bush v.
Gore that would be entitled to respect according to the doctrine of stare
decisis is not straightforward. Whether you like McConnell or not, you know
what it holds: the First Amendment does not bar Congress from prohibiting
corporations and unions from funding electioneering messages. Same with
Grutter: Equal Protection does not rule out the use of race as a factor in
university admissions. By contrast, exactly what Bush v. Gore holds is not so
clear: it invalidates variation in recount procedures, at least with respect to
the differential treatment of dimpled or hanging chads, but one is not
precisely sure about the scope of its underlying principle.' 1 In part because of
7 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN.
L. REv. 1173, 1173 (2006) (depicting stare decisis as "hotly contested"); Lawrence B.
Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism,
and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 155 (2006)
("Constitutional stare decisis is a hot topic.").
8 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (would overrule Austin, on
which McConnell rests); id. at 274 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 330 (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (same).
9 Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
10 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985).
11 Many have commented on the uncertainty of the holding in Bush v. Gore. See,
e.g., Richard L. Hasen, No Exit? The Roberts Court and the Future of Election Law, 57
S.C. L. REv. 669, 671 (2006); Richard B. Saphire & Paul Moke, Litigating Bush v. Gore
in the States: Dual Voting Systems and the Fourteenth Amendment, 51 VILL. L. REv. 229,
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this uncertainty, moreover, Justices hostile to the Equal Protection precedent
of Bush v. Gore might be able to easily eviscerate it without needing to
overrule it formally (a point with implications that this Article will examine).
In addition, Bush v. Gore has significance beyond its Equal Protection
holding as a case about when federal courts will intervene in state recount
proceedings. Indeed, the 5-4 division in Bush v. Gore did not concern the
substance of the Court's Equal Protection holding, but rather the majority's
remedial decision to preclude any further recounting of presidential ballots.
Thus, when speculating about Bush v. Gore in the era of the Roberts Court,
one must consider the future of not just its Equal Protection ruling, but also
its remedial decree: in what circumstances will the Court block the ongoing
operation of a state's vote-counting, or perhaps even vote-casting,
procedures? Part III of this Article addresses this second dimension of the
case's potential significance, concluding that-contrary to conventional
wisdom-the case is best understood as discouraging, rather than
encouraging, lower-court interference with a state's voting procedures while
in operation or about to get underway.
Furthermore, considering the future of Bush v. Gore, whether in its Equal
Protection or remedial dimensions, is complicated by the brute fact that the
case concerned a presidential election. Although that fact is what makes the
case so salient, it also has the potential of robbing the case of future
significance. Indeed, the majority opinion itself famously cautioned against
making too much of the case in the future. 12 To be sure, those cautionary
words appeared in the context of discussing the Equal Protection issue, but it
may be taken as an overall signal about the uniqueness of the case: when, if
ever, will there be another case in which the outcome of a presidential
election turns on the idiosyncratic failure of a single state to provide with
sufficient specificity procedures for deciding whether similarly contestable
ballots are counted or discarded? 13 Part IV of this Article considers the
potential broader implications of Bush v. Gore in light of its exceptional
prominence as a case involving a presidential election.
Despite the daunting task that confronts any speculation about the future
of Bush v. Gore, this Article will do so in the hope that systematic reflection
illuminates what is at stake as a result of the uncertainty that surrounds this
topic. Disputes over the scope of the Equal Protection holding in Bush v.
265 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 757, 765 (2001).
See also Marcia Coyle, Close Vote to Turn on 'Bush v. Gore'?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 1, 2004,
at 1.
12 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam) ("Our consideration is limited
to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes
generally presents many complexities.").
13 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, eroG .v hsuB and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v.
Gore From Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARV. L. REv. 170, 270-71 (2001).
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Gore have already arisen in the lower courts, and such disputes are likely to
widen and deepen over time, unless the Supreme Court intervenes to nip
them in the bud. Likewise, differences of opinion among federal judges about
when they should intervene in the operation of a state's voting procedures
have already forced the Supreme Court to issue its first decision since Bush
v. Gore on this remedial topic: Purcell v. Gonzalez,14 which, although far
from settling the scope of federal court remedial authority over state voting
procedures, sends a cautionary signal about the use of litigation to affect the
voting process when it is underway or imminent.
Speculating what paths the law will take on both the Equal Protection
and remedial dimensions of Bush v. Gore may help to bring about some
measure of clarity to these major yet murky issues of election law. This
Article will devote much more attention to the Equal Protection dimension of
Bush v. Gore (Part II) than to its remedial dimension (Part III), or even to its
unique institutional implications as a case involving resolution of a
presidential election (Part IV). The reason is that if there is to develop a body
of law emanating from Bush v. Gore as a precedent, that law most likely will
focus on the case's Equal Protection holding. The other two aspects of the
case are less directly tied to its legal ruling, but are more radiations or
emanations of that ruling. Nonetheless, I offer some observations on those
aspects as well in the hope they are useful to other scholarship on the future
ramifications of Bush v. Gore.
II. THE EQUAL PROTECTION HOLDING IN BUSH V. GORE
The facts of Bush v. Gore are well ingrained in the consciousness of any
election law specialist, as is the language of the Court's opinion that
identifies an Equal Protection violation on those facts. Nonetheless, a quick
review is necessary to set the stage. It will remind us of just how uncertain
we must be about the holding of Bush v. Gore itself and, thus, how difficult
the task of predicting its future.
A. A Quick Review of the Case
The key fact for Equal Protection purposes in Bush v. Gore was that
some dimpled chads were counted while others were not, depending upon
which specific recount rule was operative at the particular time and place
these dimpled chads were reviewed. Likewise, some punctured chads were
counted and others were not, depending on whether the operative rule
required a chad to be "hanging" instead. These variations existed across
counties as well as within counties, as some counties changed their rules
14 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006).
[Vol. 68:925
FUTURE OF BUSH V. GORE
midstream and, given uncertainties over what rule to apply, some individual
recount officials applied rules different from those applied by other officials
within the same county. This variability in recount rules was caused by
insufficient specificity in Florida's recount law, which simply provided that
the review of each chad should endeavor to identify "the intent of the
voter." 15
According to the Court, these facts were enough to establish an Equal
Protection violation. Indeed, the Court saw the case as one of constitutional
res ipsa loquitur. It described what had happened:
Palm Beach County, for example, began the process with a 1990 guideline
which precluded counting completely attached chads, switched to a rule that
considered a vote to be legal if any light could be seen through a chad,
changed back to the 1990 rule, and then abandoned any pretense of a per se
rule, only to have a court order that the county consider dimpled chads
legal. 16
Then, in the very next sentence, the Court forthrightly declared: "This is
not a process with sufficient guarantees of equal treatment." 17 The Court
identified other Equal Protection concerns as well-the fact that some
counties included overvotes in addition to undervotes in their recounts, while
others did not, and the fact that the recounts might remain incomplete in
some counties while completed in othersl 8-but there is no doubt that the
Court would have found an Equal Protection violation if the only problem
before it had been the variation in treatment of dimpled and punctured chads
caused by the lack of a sufficiently specific recount rule in state law.
What remains in doubt, and very much so, is why this problem alone
constitutes an Equal Protection violation. As is often observed, the Court said
very little in support of its decision. 19 It did point out that recount rules more
specific than discerning "the intent of the voter" were feasible in this context.
Given their feasibility, the Court considered them obligatory: "The
formulation of uniform rules to determine intent based on these recurring
15 Bush, 531 U.S. at 105-06 (per curiam).
16 Id. at 106.
17 Id. at 106-07.
18 Id. at 108-09.
19 Tribe, supra note 13, at 221. See also Cass R. Sunstein, The Equal Chance to
Have One's Vote Count, 21 LAW & PHIL. 121, 126 (2002) (defending the minimalist
reasoning of Bush v. Gore). But see. Cass R. Sunstein, Lawless Order and Hot Cases, in
A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION 75, 90 (Ronald Dworkin ed., 2002) (criticizing Bush v.
Gore as a "subminimalist" decision).
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circumstances is practicable and, we -conclude, necessary." 20 But the Court
never identified the principle that derives obligation from feasibility.
The Court also pointed out that the recount process it was reviewing was
a court-ordered one, and, therefore, uniformity could be expected (again, to
the extent feasible) over the scope of the recount covered by the court's
order, in this case all presidential ballots statewide. "[W]e are presented with
a situation where a state court with the power to assure uniformity has
ordered a statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards." 21 The
Court added: "When a court orders a statewide remedy, there must be at least
some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and
fundamental fairness are satisfied."'2 2 But the Court did not go further in
saying what, those "rudimentary requirements" were. Nor did the Court
explain why a statewide recount triggered by a state statutory requirement
rather than court order-but resulting in the same variation in treatment of
dimpled chads (because the state statute simply directed the recount to
identify "the intent of the voter")--might not constitute the same sort of
Equal Protection violation.
Moreover, the Court did not merely say little. It went out of its way to
make clear that it did not want to say more. "Our consideration is limited to
the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election
processes generally presents many complexities." 23 This most-mocked
sentence in the Court's opinion-and unfairly so-is not an avowal of an
unprincipled power grab, but most likely is just a caution that the Court's
holding may not be as broad as some might wish or think.24 Even so, a line
like this makes it difficult to distinguish which new cases would be governed
by Bush v. Gore, resulting in a similar finding of unconstitutionality, and
which would not.
B. A Taxonomy of Potential Bush v. Gore Claims
Even before Bush v. Gore was decided, speculation had started over the
potential implications of a ruling that the Florida recount procedures violated
Equal Protection. At oral argument, the question arose whether the use of
different types of voting machines in different counties within a state might
violate Equal Protection given the wide variation in error rates among these
20 Bush, 531 U.S. at 106 (per curiam).
21 Id. at 109.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 See Steven J. Mulroy, Lemonade From Lemons: Can Advocates Convert Bush v.
Gore Into a Vehicle for Reform?, 9 GEO. J. ON POvERTY L. & POL'Y 357, 364 (2002).
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machines.25 Indeed, the Court's desire to forestall the assumption that this
result would inevitably flow from its holding was what prompted it to issue
its cautionary words about the potential narrowness of the decision. ("The
question before the Court is not whether local entities, in the exercise of their
expertise, may develop different systems for implementing elections." 26)
Now that a few election cycles have occurred since Bush v. Gore, it is
possible to discern a wide array of potential cases that might arise where that
precedent is cited to support a claimed Equal Protection violation. It is still
far too early for a large body of lower court precedents to have developed
concerning these types of cases. Nonetheless, pending or contemplated
litigation over events that occurred in recent elections inevitably invites
speculation about which fact patterns give rise to a valid Equal Protection
claim and which do not.
The fact patterns that have emerged thus far can be classified into at least
four different categories of potential Bush v. Gore claims. From narrowest to
broadest, in relationship to the facts of Bush v. Gore itself, they are: (1)
differential treatment of ballots caused by insufficiently specified standards;
(2) differential treatment of ballots caused by failure to follow specified
standards; (3) variations in local voting administration practices resulting
from local discretion specifically authorized by state law; and (4) local
variations in the ease or difficulty of casting a ballot as a result of intentional
decisions by central administrators to distribute election-related resources
unequally among localities. An explanation of each category will provide a
foundation for attempting to predict the likelihood that the Court would
consider cases within each category as establishing an Equal Protection
violation.
1. Insufficiently Specified Standards
This category is the closest to Bush v. Gore itself. But it encompasses
fact patterns that have nothing to do with chads (dimpled, punctured, or
otherwise). For example, as revealed in 2004, different election officials may
reach opposite results concerning the eligibility of provisional ballots
because state law fails to specify sufficiently rules for making these
eligibility determinations. 27
25 Transcript of Oral Argument at 74, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-
949).
26 Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 (per curiam).
27 See Edward B. Foley, The Promise and Problems of Provisional Voting, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1193 (2005). See also THE EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, RUTGERS,
THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY & THE MORrrz COLLEGE OF LAW, THE OHIO
STATE. UNIVERSITY, REPORT TO THE U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION ON BEST
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In many states, the relevant statute provides only that local election
officials must determine whether a provisional ballot was cast by a registered
voter without specifying the steps that these local officials must take to verify
the voter's registration.28 As a result, some local officials simply check their
electronic database to see if it contains a record for the provisional voter,
whereas other local officials will take the extra step of double-checking
registration forms in the event that a clerical error prevented the electronic
database from accurately recording the provisional voter's valid registration.
This variation in local procedures, as a result of the insufficiently specified
state standard, results in the rejection of some provisional ballots equivalent
to others that are counted.
The outcome of the 2004 gubernatorial election in Washington almost
turned on a clerical error of this kind. Litigation caused local officials to
discover that they had rejected several hundred ballots because they had
failed to check signatures against original registration records, not just
computer databases.29 Once this mistake was revealed, local officials
voluntarily chose to count the previously rejected ballots, thereby avoiding a
further Equal Protection challenge based on Bush v. Gore.30 The decision to
count these previously rejected ballots gave the election to the Democratic
candidate rather than the Republican. 31
In 2006 in Ohio, a federal court suit was filed alleging that the
requirement in state law that says merely that local officials must examine
their "records" to determine the eligibility of provisional voters is
insufficiently specific. 32 "The statute does not specify which 'records'
Boards of Elections should examine, or impose any requirements that every
Board of Elections examine the same record, '' 33 as the complaint in the case
PRACTICES TO IMPROVE PROVISIONAL VOTING PURSUANT TO THE HELP AMERICA VOTE
ACT OF 2002, PUBLIC LAW 107-252, at 15 (June 28, 2006) [hereinafter BESTPRACTICES].
28 BEST PRACTICES, supra note 27, at app. F.
29 Wash. State Democratic Cent. Comm. v. King County Records, Elections &
Licensing Servs. Div., No. 04-2-36048-0-SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. King County. Nov. 16,
2004), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/docs/WSDCC/
WSDCCorder2.pdf.
30 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed that the local officials were entitled to
amend their official returns in this way. Wash. State Republican Party v. King County
Div. of Records, 103 P.3d 725, 727-28 (Wash. 2004).
31 Chris McGann & Lewis Kamb, GOP to Fight Gregoire Victory: Democrat Wins
Second Recount by 130 Votes, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 24, 2004, at Al;
Chris McGann, Third Time May Be a Charm for Gregoire: She Leads by 10 as Court
Allows 735 County Ballots, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 23, 2004, at Al.
32 OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.183(B)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
33 Complaint at 31, Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Blackwell, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 78158 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 2006) (No. C2-06-896) [hereinafter NEOCH v.
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puts it, clearly invoking a Bush v. Gore claim as a basis for relief. Asking for
a declaratory judgment that the insufficient specificity of Ohio's provisional
ballot laws violates Equal Protection, the suit also seeks an injunction
requiring the Secretary of State to issue sufficient clarifying directives to
assure uniform application of the law in all the state's counties.34
Furthermore, there are other ways in which local variation can occur in
the verification of provisional ballots as a result of insufficiently specific
state laws. Whether a provisional ballot will count or not can depend on
whether the signature on the provisional ballot's envelope matches, in the
view of local election officials, the signature on file for that voter. If state law
does not specify how local officials are to determine whether or not the two
signatures match, more lenient local standards may cause more provisional
ballots to be counted there than in localities with more stringent signature
matching standards. 35 Likewise, state law may require a match between the
name on the provisional ballot's envelope and the name on the corresponding
registration form, and yet fail to specify whether a "Hank" matches a
"Henry," or a "Dotty" matches a "Dorothy." 36 Or state law may fail to tell
Blackwell], available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/docs/WSDCCIWSDCC
order2.pdf.
34 Id. at 51. On November 1, and then again on November 14, the federal court
adopted Consent Orders agreed to by the parties for the purpose of counting provisional
ballots for the 2006 election.
35 The disputed 2004 gubernatorial election in Washington included the claim that
the lack of a specific uniform standard for checking signatures on absentee or provisional
ballot envelopes with signatures on voter registration forms caused county-by-county
disparities in rates at which ballots were rejected. McDonald v. Reed, 103 P.3d 722, 723
(Wash. 2004). This claim seems to have been based on Equal Protection as embodied in
state rather than federal constitutional law. Id. at 723-24 ("Petitioners suggest in their
reply brief that a claimed disparity in signature-checking standards implicates equal
protection concerns under the privileges and immunities clause of our state
constitution ...."). In any event, the state supreme court rejected the claim in part
because it could not discern a specific signature-matching standard that it could compel
election administrators to follow: "Significantly, petitioners do not suggest that any
particular method of signature verification is faulty, or what uniform method should be
mandated by the Secretary." Id. at 724 n.2.
In another recent case, Harrison v. Stanley, 193 S.W.3d 581 (Tex. App. 2006),
which involved a tie vote in a city council election, a Texas state appeals court rejected a
claim that local election officials improperly rejected three mail-in ballots because the
signatures on their envelopes did not match signatures on file. This decision provoked a
dissent from denial of en banc consideration on the ground that the signature-rejecting
procedures employed to reject these ballots were a violation of Equal Protection
according to the principles articulated in Bush v. Gore. See Harrison, 193 S.W.3d at 589
(Jennings, J., dissenting from denial of en banc consideration).
3 6 See JUSTIN LEVITT, WENDY R. WEISER & ANA MuNoz, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, MAKING THE LIST: DATABASE MATCHING AND VERIFICATION PROCESSES FOR
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local officials what to do if some provisional ballot envelopes are smudged,
illegible, or contain technical errors or omissions, with the consequence that
some local officials bend over backwards to count any provisional ballot they
are capable of verifying, while others are willing to reject any provisional
ballot that is deficient in some way. 37
The new voter identification laws of 2006, at least in Ohio, created new
ways in which provisional ballots might receive differential treatment by
local officials as a result of insufficiently specific state rules. 38 Under these
VOTER REGISTRATION 8-9 (2006), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/
dynamic/subpages/download file 35559.pdf. One current lawsuit over database
matching raises a different issue: whether a state violates federal statutory law requiring a
match in order to enter a new voter in the registration database. The federal district court
has preliminarily enjoined the State of Washington's enforcement of this kind of law,
which was adopted in the aftermath of that state's fiasco in its gubernatorial election of
2004. Wash. Ass'n of Churches v. Reed, 492 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (W.D. Wash. 2006).
37 The first wave of litigation alleging discrepancies of this kind occurred in 2004.
See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 40-41, League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Blackwell,
432 F. Supp. 2d 742 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (No. 3:05CV7309) ("In at least one county
(Greene), voters casting provisional ballots in the correct precincts apparently were
disenfranchised when poll workers ran out of envelopes for their precinct and instructed
voters to use envelopes borrowed from other precincts. On information and belief, the
ballots cast in the "wrong" envelopes apparently were not counted even though the poll
workers had noted the correct precinct number on the borrowed envelopes."). See also id.
at 42 ("[O]n information and belief, Cleveland officials alone disqualified approximately
one-third of the provisional ballots-a rate that is extremely high and indicative of
otherwise eligible provisional ballots being thrown out because of errors in the balloting
process, not because of voter ineligibility.").
These kinds of allegations again surfaced in 2006. See Complaint, supra note 33, at
37 ([T]he statute does not explain whether Boards of Elections would be permitted to
reject and not count provisional ballots simply because they find themselves unable-
whether due to technical constraints, an insufficient amount of time before the results
must be certified, or insufficient manpower-to determine whether some or all
provisional voters are qualified, registered or eligible to vote."). See also id. ("The
Defendant has not issued guidance regarding what circumstances would allow or justify
Boards of Elections to conclude that they are unable to determine whether a voter is
qualified, registered or eligible to vote."). As it turned out, in Ohio in 2006, the Secretary
of State adopted a deliberate policy of refusing to provide clarifying standards to local
boards of elections. See Internet Video: 2008 and Beyond: The Future of Election and
Ethics Reform in the States (Kent State Univ. 2007),
http://dept.kent.edu/columbus/symposium/ (remarks of current Secretary of State,
concerning the policy of her predecessor, at a symposium held in Columbus, Ohio on
Jan. 17, 2007).
38 Ohio's new voter ID laws were enacted in two phases. The main part, including
those provisions applicable to conventional in-precinct voting, was adopted as part of the
state's general overhaul of its voting administration law in 2005, a piece of legislation
known as "HB3." Some of the ID provisions applicable specifically to Ohio's new "no
fault" absentee voting regime were adopted in the law establishing that regime, HB234.
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laws, provisional ballots must be rejected if the voter fails to provide proper
identification; 39 thus, local variation in the understanding of what counts as
proper identification, because the new state law is insufficiently clear, can
cause provisional ballots submitted with the exact same form of ID to be
counted or rejected depending upon the particular locality in which they are
cast. Indeed, two weeks before Election Day in Ohio, a lawsuit alleged that
local disparities had already emerged in the counting of absentee ballots,
with the threat of similar disparities in the counting of provisional ballots cast
on Election Day.40 The suit identified several different ways in which ballots
were being treated differently in different localities because of insufficient
guidance from the state's legislature or Secretary of State: (1) different local
interpretations of when a utility bill is "current"; (2) different local
interpretations of what qualifies as "other government identification" (for
example, those issued by state universities); and (3) different local
interpretations of whether one or both numbers displayed on a state driver's
license qualify as a "driver's license number." A partial settlement of the suit
before Election Day, combined with the failure of any statewide race to end
up close enough where litigating the remaining issues might make a
difference to the outcome, ultimately prevented a statewide recount involving
an Equal Protection claim premised on the precedent of Bush v. Gore.
Nonetheless, the question remains whether any of these fact patterns
involving the differential treatment of provisional ballots because of
insufficiently specified standards in state law, if these fact patterns were to
make their way to the U.S. Supreme Court, would be recognized as
establishing an Equal Protection violation on the authority of Bush v. Gore.
2. Failure to Follow Specified Standards
Both the 2004 and 2006 elections generated allegations about local
variations in the treatment of voters and their ballots not only because of
insufficiently specific statewide standards, but also because of the failure by
some local officials to follow statewide rules even when they are spelled out.
For example, with respect to provisional ballots in Ohio and elsewhere, even
after administrative directives and pre-election court decisions clarified that
provisional ballots count only if they are cast in the correct precinct,
These new ID rules are codified at OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3505.18, 3509.03
(LexisNexis Supp. 2007).
39 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3505.183(B)(4)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007). See also
Nathan Cemenska, 50 Questions for 5 States, Ohio, Answer to Question 31, ELECTION
LAW @ MOiRTZ, Sept. 5, 2006, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/election06/50-
5_ohio.php#31.
40 Complaint, supra note 33, at 31.
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allegations surfaced that officials in some localities deviated from this policy,
counting provisional ballots as long as the voters were registered. 41
Some localities took it upon themselves to adopt the so-called "right
church, wrong pew" compromise position, meaning that they would count
provisional ballots cast at any precinct that shared the same polling place
with other precincts (a school gymnasium, for example), even if the
provisional ballot was submitted to the wrong precinct table within that
polling location, but would reject a provisional ballot cast at a polling place
that did not include the correct precinct for that ballot. Local variation on this
compromise position might be viewed as the exercise of discretion in the
absence of sufficiently clear instructions if state law were properly
understood to remain unresolved on the "right church, wrong pew" point. But
where state law was clear, even if rigidly unforgiving, local decisions to
adopt the "right church, wrong pew" compromise are examples of local
failure to follow specific state rules, thereby causing differential treatment of
similarly situated provisional ballots depending upon the voter's locality. In
other words, some provisional ballots cast in the "right church, wrong pew"
situation would be rejected, while, across the state, provisional ballots cast in
this same situation would be counted.
An effort to minimize the number of provisional ballots cast in the wrong
precinct led to another way in which local variation resulted from some local
officials failing to follow specific state rules. States requiring the rejection of
these "wrong precinct" provisional ballots adopted specific statewide rules
instructing poll workers to inform provisional voters that their ballots would
not count if cast in the wrong precinct and that voters instead should go to the
correct precinct in order to cast a ballot that would count. These statewide
rules further required poll workers, based on information available at all
polling places within a county, to tell the would-be provisional voter where
to go to cast a countable ballot based on that voter's home address. In 2004
and again in 2006, allegations arose that some poll workers failed to follow
these instructions.42 As a consequence, some voters who showed up at the
41 Amended Complaint, supra note 37, at 42-45, 54. See also BEST PRACTICES,
supra note 27, at app. D, 7-11; Michael Gisick, Counting of Final Ballots to Begin,
ALBUQUERQUE TRIB., Nov. 13, 2006, at A1; Jo Mannies, Disputed Ballots from Aug. 3
Primary Will be Counted, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 28, 2004, at 15; Bill Sloat,
Democrats Take Up Fight Over Ballots, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 18, 2004, at
Al.
42 Amended Complaint, supra note 37, at 43; Lee Bailey, Letter to the Editor, Board
of Elections Makes Mistakes, Too, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 30, 2006, at A18; Carl
Chancellor, Citizens Tell Panel of Voting Troubles, AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 21, 2004, at
B 1. See also Kevin Mayhood, Groups Sue to Block Voter ID Rules: Union, Homeless
Coalition Argue Measure is Being Applied Inconsistently Across State, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Oct. 25, 2006, at D3.
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wrong precinct were successfully redirected to the right place so that they
were able to cast a ballot that counted, whereas other voters had no such luck
and instead submitted a provisional ballot that was ultimately rejected
because it was cast at the wrong precinct. This disparate treatment of voters,
moreover, was not merely between different counties of the same state, but
also within counties, as the failure of poll workers to follow these
instructions occurred at different polling places within the same county and,
indeed, at different times of the day within the same polling place. In this
respect at least, the variable treatment of similarly situated voters was
comparable to what occurred in Bush v. Gore, although the cause of the
variation was different (local rule-breaching versus local gap-filling).
Likewise, in 2006, local errors in the enforcement of new voter
identification rules caused disparities in the treatment of similar ballots. For
example, Ohio's new voter ID law was complicated (because it provided a
wide array of qualifying forms of ID), yet upon careful inspection it was
clear that an unexpired driver's license sufficed even if it did not show the
same address as where the voter currently lived and was registered to vote.
Nevertheless, there were widespread reports of local officials failing to
understand this aspect of the new law.4 3 The preemptive litigation in Ohio
that produced a settlement shortly before Election Day prevented ballots
from being rejected because of this mistake.44 But similar errors by local
officials occurred in other states: for example, requiring photo ID even when
state law (or a recent court order) permitted alternative forms of non-photo
ID. 4
5
In all these examples of local error, the question is whether the resulting
disparate treatment of similarly situated ballots-some count while others do
not, even though they share the same characteristics-violates the Equal
43 Kevin Mayhood & Robert Vitale, Provisional Ballots Given Some Leeway,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 15, 2006, at Al; Jennifer Mrozowski, Some Voters Get
Tripped Up on New ID Rules, Machines, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 8, 2006, at Al;
Jennifer Mrozowski, Vexed Voters Include Chabot, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 8, 2006,
at B2. See also Ann Fisher, Handling of Voter-ID Issue Did Not Inspire Confidence,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 6, 2006, at C1.
44 Consent Order at 3, NEOCH v. Blackwell, No. C2-06-896 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 1,
2006), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/
NEOCHConsentOrd.pdf.
45 See BRIEFING: THE 2006 ELECTION, ELECTIONLINE, Nov. 2006, at 10,
http://electionline.org/Portals/l/Publications/EB 15.briefing.pdf; Brian Feagans, Photo,
Please? Some Didn't Get It, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Nov. 8, 2006, at D 12;
Leah Thorsen & Elizabethe Holland, Voting Glitches-Not Many, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 8, 2006, at B 1; Ian Urbina, Polling Places Report Some Snags; Even Top
Politicians Have Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at P1; Tova Andrea Wang & Jonah
H. Goldman, Fixing the 2008 Election, Nov. 14, 2006, http://www.reformelections.org/
commentary.asp?opedid= 1440.
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Protection Clause. Certain kinds of errors have the effect of counting ballots
that should have been rejected (for example, local leniency regarding
provisional ballots cast at the wrong precinct), while other errors cause
ballots to be rejected that should have been counted (for example,
erroneously stringent enforcement of ID rules, or failure to inform wrong-
precinct provisional voters where to go instead). Perhaps this distinction
makes a difference under the Equal Protection Clause, although arguably the
resulting inequality in the ability to cast a countable ballot is unconstitutional
in both situations. After all, the Clause protects against discrimination with
respect to the right to vote, whether that discrimination is viewed as some
citizens enjoying greater voting opportunities than others, or some citizens
suffering from lesser voting rights than others. In any event, it remains
unsettled what will be the ultimate resolution of Equal Protection claims
involving either differentially favorable or unfavorable local errors in the
administration of statewide voting rules.
3. Specific, State-Authorized Local Discretion
This next category is the one that surfaced in Bush v. Gore itself and has
received the most sustained attention since then, including vigorous debate
between the majority and dissenting opinions in Stewart v. Blackwell, a Sixth
Circuit case presenting an Equal Protection challenge to the use of different
types of voting machines in different Ohio counties. 46 The complaint focused
on the use of punch-card machines in some counties, the same type that
produced the problem of dimpled and punctured chads in Bush v. Gore, in
comparison with touchscreen machines, which do not present the same
problem of machine-rejected ballots. The Sixth Circuit panel decision
sustained the Equal Protection challenge by a hotly divided 2-1 vote, and that
panel decision was vacated by a decision of the full Sixth Circuit to hear the
case en banc, but on the eve of oral argument the appeal was voluntarily
withdrawn as moot on the ground that punch card machines had since been
replaced and were unlikely to return. 47
46444 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 2006) (panel decision regarding plaintiffs' Equal
Protection claim reversed; panel opinion regarding plaintiffs' Voting Rights Act claim
vacated; and rehearing en banc granted), superseded by 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (en
banc), vacating as moot 356 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2004). (My Moritz colleague
Dan Tokaji was an attorney for the plaintiffs in this case.)
47 One must read the panel majority and dissents in their entirety to get a full sense
of vitriol hurled at each other. But one snippet may provide an indication. In response to
the dissent's assertion that the court "should heed the Supreme Court's own warning and
limit the reach of Bush v. Gore to the peculiar and extraordinary facts of that case,"
Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d at 886 (Gilman, J., dissenting), the majority retorted:
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The use of different types of voting machines in different counties within
a state was also challenged in Florida.48 There, however, the particular claim
was that the use of touchscreen machines without a paper trail was a denial
of Equal Protection because counties employing optical scan machines would
have a paper record in the event of a recount. The plaintiffs claimed that a
paper record gave voters a measure of protection lacking to voters in a
county with paperless touchscreen machines. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit
unanimously rejected this claim, and the Supreme Court recently denied
certiorari. 49
These complaints about different vote-counting technologies in different
localities within a state present a claim that is analytically distinct from the
Equal Protection claim in Bush v. Gore, as the Court itself recognized. 50 The
problem is not local variation in the implementation of a vague statewide
directive. Rather, the state law is unambiguous in giving local officials the
authority to choose among different types of vote-counting technologies.
And, although the different error rates of these different machines provides
the basis for the Equal Protection challenge to the machines that are more
error prone, these cases are analytically different from those involving the
erroneous failure of local officials themselves to follow state law. The local
decision to employ the more error-prone technology was not itself a failure to
Murky, transparent, illegitimate, right, wrong, big, tall, short or small; regardless of
the adjective one might use to describe the decision, the proper noun that precedes
it--"Supreme Court"-carries more weight with us. Whatever else Bush v. Gore
may be, it is first and foremost a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
and we are bound to adhere to it.
Id. at 859 n.8.
48 Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226, 1227 (1 1th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 934 (2007).
49 Id. at 1233. Although not necessarily incorrect in this result, the Eleventh
Circuit's reasoning-that overall votes were not more likely to be lost using paperless
touchscreens instead of optical scans-might be viewed as prematurely na've in light of
the 18,000 undervotes on paperless touchscreen machines in Florida's Thirteenth
congressional district in 2006. (For information on the issues involved concerning the
conflict over Florida's 13th congressional district, see Election Law @ Moritz, Recount
Roundup 2006: Florida- 13, http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/news/RecountRoundup
Floridal3thDistrict.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2007)). While ballot design may turn out to
be the primary culprit in this particular case, a paper record of the touchscreen vote might
have helped some voters discover the fact that they had skipped this race, and in any
event the paper record could assist in ruling out certain kinds of machine errors as the
cause of the undervote. Moreover, dissatisfaction with paperless touchscreens in the
context of a recount may lead Congress to enact a new national paper-record requirement.
50 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) (per curiam). See also text accompanying
note 25.
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follow state law; on the contrary, state law specifically permitted this local
decision.
The fact that this kind of claim is analytically distinct from the one
presented in Bush v. Gore itself does not necessarily make it unmeritorious.
To be sure, the majority opinion in Bush v. Gore warned against assuming
the validity of this kind of claim. But the majority opinion did not purport to
foreclose it. Thus, the merits of these challenges to local variation in voting
technology must be considered in light of more general Equal Protection
principles, a task that the appeals court judges in these two cases attempted to
undertake.
This analytically distinct third category of claims, however, potentially
involves more than just local variation in the choice of different vote-
counting machines. It could also include local variations in other aspects of
the voting administration process that could differentially affect the ability of
citizens to exercise their right to vote. For example, it could involve the
failure of locally chosen technology concerning parts of the voting
administration process other than the counting of ballots, as occurred on a
calamitous scale in Denver during the 2006 election.51 That city, as
authorized by state law, had adopted a new form of "electronic pollbook" to
facilitate the verification of a voter's registration on Election Day. That
system, full of promise but inadequately tested, crashed as soon as poll
workers throughout the city attempted to access electronically the centralized
database of registration records at the same time. The consequence was
horrendously long lines, several hours in length, that prevented perhaps as
many as 20,000 voters from casting a ballot that day as they had intended.
This discriminatory disenfranchisement of some Colorado citizens almost
formed the basis of a challenge to two statewide races, but both turned out
not to be quite close enough for this number of disenfranchised voters to
have made a difference. Had a contest occurred, it would have been expected
that one of the legal grounds for challenging the discriminatory
disenfranchisement that resulted from the local choice to use this untested
technology would have been an Equal Protection claim. The argument would
have been that, although the defective electronic pollbooks in Denver did not
disenfranchise voters as directly as defective punch-card or paperless
touchscreen machines in some counties in Ohio or Florida, nonetheless the
local choice and faulty implementation of this defective technology had the
effect of disenfranchising a subset of the state's eligible voters.
51 For a collection of news stories describing the Denver meltdown, see Election
Law @ Moritz, Recount Roundup 2006: Colorado Secretary of State, http://
moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/news/RecountRoundup2006ColoradoSecretaryofState.php
(last visited Oct. 30, 2007).
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Of course, it does not take technological failures for the misguided
exercise of local discretion to cause the discriminatory disenfranchisement of
voters in that locality. Local officials, delegated by state law to decide how
many voting machines to use in each precinct, may make woefully
thickheaded choices, with the consequence that an insufficient supply of
machines causes inordinately long lines to occur at some precincts but not
others. As is well known, something like this occurred in several Ohio
counties in 2004, with lines lasting as long as seven hours at one polling
place, while voters elsewhere in the state breezed in and out in 30 minutes or
less.52
Similar administrative misjudgments may occur at the local level with
respect to hiring and training of poll workers. If a particular county has
poorly trained poll workers, or not enough of them, or (even worse) both, the
consequence may be excessively long lines that prevent voters from casting a
ballot, just as if too few machines or some kind of technological failure
causes those unendurable lines. More catastrophic still, some local decisions
may cause there to be too few provisional ballots on hand at particular
precincts, with the consequence that some voters are unable to cast a ballot
no matter how long they are able to wait in line.
During the Maryland primary election in 2006, some poll workers
resorted to using scrap paper as makeshift ballots to avoid
disenfranchisement of this kind. 53 Of course, if other poll workers in the
same situation were unwilling to accept such an unorthodox remedy, then the
resulting differential treatment of these similarly situated voters presents
another form of potential Equal Protection claim.
After the 2004 election in Ohio, the League of Women Voters filed a
complaint claiming that all these forms of administrative mismanagement-
and more-caused discriminatory disenfranchisement of Ohio voters
depending upon the locality in which they lived. 54 The case has the potential
of being one of the most significant in the field of voting administration, as
the complaint essentially asks the federal court to take over supervision of
the state's entire voting administration system. The district court has denied
the state's motion to dismiss, ruling that the facts alleged, if true, amount to a
52 See Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion,
Disenfranchisement, and the Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1206,
1238-39 (2005).
53 Susan Biddle, A Look at What Went Wrong in Montgomery, WASH. POST, Sept.
14, 2006, at A25; Melissa Harris, Provisional Ballots Getting Close Attention;
Painstaking Sorting Process is Under Way, BALT. SUN, Sept. 19, 2006, at B5.
54 Amended Complaint, League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Blackwell, 432 F.
Supp. 2d 723 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (No. 3:05-CV7309), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/amendedcomplaint.pdf.
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valid Equal Protection claim in light of Bush v. Gore.55 The state's
interlocutory appeal, certified by the district court because of the case's
importance, is pending before the Sixth Circuit (although presumably not the
same panel that decided Stewart v. Blackwell).56 The case is likely to settle
before the Sixth Circuit decides the appeal, however, because the 2006
election has brought a change in Ohio's Secretary of State, who has
expressed sympathy with the League's complaint and is seeking to have the
case amicably resolved. 57
4. Local Variations by Central Design
Some inequalities in a voter's ability to cast a ballot may be caused by
decentralized decision making--different local boards making different
judgments about how many voting machines, poll workers, or provisional
ballots they need at each polling location-but some local inequalities may
be the result of a deliberate, centralized decision. For example, a central
planner may decide to equip each precinct with the same number of voting
machines without taking account of differences in expected turnout, or
differences in the number of items to vote (more "down-ballot" candidates or
issues in some precincts compared to others), or differences in the average
speed at which voters can complete their ballots (caused by differences in
age, literacy levels, or perhaps other socioeconomic factors). Because of this
"one size fits all" approach, excessively long lines emerge at some local
precincts, but not at others.
This fourth category of possible Bush v. Gore claims can occur when the
central decisionmaker is itself a county election board, rather than a
statewide authority, and the complaint is about discriminatory
disenfranchisement among voters at different precincts within the single
county. In this respect, this kind of claim resembles the variability in recount
rules applied to equivalently dimpled chads within a single Florida county,
but the cause of inequality is not different interpretations of a vague standard
by different individual officials (or a change in interpretation by local
55 League of Women Voters v. Blackwell, 432 F. Supp. 2d 723, 728 (N.D. Ohio
2005).
56 The appellate papers, along with the district court documents in the case, are
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/lwv05.php. The identity of the
Sixth Circuit panel for this case will be revealed publicly two weeks before the oral
argument. See 6th Cir. I.O.P. 34(c)(2).
57 Mark Niquette & James Nash, Elections Suits May Be Settled.- Brunner, Dann to
Rethink Those with Constitutional Merit, COLUMBUs DISPATCH, Jan. 18, 2007, at C 1. The
article quotes the new Secretary of State, Jennifer Brunner, as saying in reference to the
League of Women Voters case: "[T]he kinds of things they're pushing for are things that
make it easier and better for people to vote, and why would we be against that?"
[Vol. 68:925
FUTURE OF BUSH V. GORE
authorities). Moreover, unlike Bush v. Gore itself, or the examples involving
local variations in evaluating the eligibility of provisional ballots, this kind of
claim does not involve local officials making ballot-by-ballot decisions to
reject, rather than count, a vote. Instead, it involves the central decisionmaker
deliberately allocating electoral resources in a way that provides citizens with
unequal voting opportunities depending upon the precinct in which they live.
Claims in this fourth category may end up having little chance of
success. Superficially, they appear similar to complaints about unequal
educational opportunities at schools in different localities as a result of
centralized decisions concerning the method of financing school operations,
a kind of Equal Protection claim that was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.58 But an evaluation
of the merits of this kind of claim is not the point right now; merely, the
observation that they form an analytically distinct category from those
previously considered. Moreover, the merits of particular cases within this
category may ultimately depend on the strength of their particular facts.
Suppose, for example, that a county election board sends only half the
number of provisional ballots to some precincts compared to others, based on
predictions of different turnout rates-predictions that themselves turn out to
be egregiously incorrect and based on irresponsible assumptions. Would the
resulting inability of some voters to cast ballots, because of the particular
polling place where they go to vote, really not state a plausible Equal
Protection claim worthy of more extensive consideration?
To be sure, polling place inequalities by themselves would not be enough
to establish an Equal Protection violation. The provisional ballots for one
polling place could all be destroyed when the truck taking them there skids
off the road and catches on fire. Similarly, a power outage in one part of
town may cause voting to stop for several hours at polling locations in the
area, causing lines there to back up to over four hours in length, while voting
proceeds smoothly across town. Presumably, the state action doctrine
applicable to Equal Protection claims would preclude valid claims arising
from voting inequalities caused by "acts of God," unless, of course,
responsibility could be attributed to state or local officials in adopting
inadequate contingency plans. If it turned out that some counties had adopted
superior contingency plans-for example, backup generators for their voting
machines in the event of a power outage-then complaints about unequal
voting opportunities in different counties would fall into the third category of
Bush v. Gore claims: those involving different county-level choices in
exercising voting administration discretion delegated by the state.
58 411 U.S. 1, 44-55 (1973).
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C. Do New Bush v. Gore Claims Have "Right Answers "?
With at least these four analytically distinct categories of possible Equal
Protection claims to consider (and there may be more), it is difficult to
project the future of Bush v. Gore as a precedent. Which of the potential
claims we have identified will prove meritorious, and which will not? This
question is exceedingly vexing for reasons both jurisprudential and practical.
Nonetheless, it is worth exploring, if only to shed some light on why it is so
difficult to answer.
In undertaking this inquiry we should start with the assumption that,
whenever each new Equal Protection claim that invokes the authority of Bush
v. Gore is put before a court on its merits, the question of whether that claim
should be sustained or rejected is one that, in law, has an objectively correct
answer, even if that answer is extremely difficult to ascertain. This
assumption, associated most famously with the jurisprudence of Ronald
Dworkin, is undoubtedly controversial, although perhaps more so than it
should be for reasons that Dworkin himself has endeavored to explain.59 The
objectivity of the correct answer we assume to exist is not a metaphysical
proposition; rather, it is simply a shared conviction on both sides of any case,
when each side argues that it deserves to win under the law, that its argument
is indeed better and its victory would not be entirely arbitrary from the
standpoint of the law itself.60 Whenever anyone claims that Bush v. Gore
itself was wrongly decided, or, conversely, whenever anyone endeavors to
defend its Equal Protection decision against its critics, one is making this
very basic assumption about the existence of an objective truth as to whether
Bush v. Gore was a proper or improper decision.
The objectivity of the law in this limited sense, moreover, is what all
judges presume as a professional matter when they purport to decide a case
correctly, including when as dissenters they assert that the majority got the
case wrong (and not merely had an inferior subjective preference about what
the outcome should be). Indeed, it is the congruence between every judge's
professional attitude in each case and Dworkin's "right answer"
jurisprudential claim that makes that claim so cogent, even in the face of its
many practical and theoretical difficulties.
When all is said and done, we might have to abandon our assumption
that there is a right answer to each case that presses a claim based on the
precedent of Bush v. Gore. We may have to conclude that it is not
meaningful to search for right answers to claims derivative of Bush v.
59 See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 41-43 (2006).
60 Here's how Dworkin himself puts it: "Have you yourself found any ordinary legal
argument on balance the soundest, in any kind of hard case? Then you, too, have rejected
the no-right-answer thesis I take to be the target of my own claim." Id. at 42.
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Gore-perhaps not even in the same way that we presume it meaningful to
search for (and make arguments about) right answers in affirmative action,
campaign finance, or other kinds of cases involving contested propositions of
constitutional law. If so, then we would have to wonder whether Bush v.
Gore has created a distinctive jurisprudential problem not applicable in other
areas, or whether, instead, it has exposed a deep-rooted jurisprudential
uncertainty not evident elsewhere (analogous perhaps to the way that protons
do not appear to be composed of elusive quarks except on impact from high-
energy bombardment by particle accelerators). But before leaping to any
conclusion of this sort, we should endeavor to consider whether evaluating
the merits of claims based on Bush v. Gore is susceptible to the same
traditional forms of legal reasoning that we would apply to any other difficult
question of constitutional law. As Dworkin himself has acknowledged, the
search for right answers to difficult legal questions is an aspirational
undertaking, one that we do to keep faith with our shared sense of
community, and in this spirit we can start out by aspiring to identify the right
answer to the various novel claims premised on Bush v. Gore that we have
been able to identify.61
In undertaking this endeavor, we can employ Dworkin's construct of the
ideal judge, Hercules, who strives towards legal truth using full power of
human knowledge and perspicuity.62 In invoking Justice Hercules, we do not
need to embrace all the methodological arguments that Dworkin makes about
how Hercules would attempt to identify the right answer to a difficult
constitutional question. Over the last few years, there has been a vigorous
debate between Dworkin and Cass Sunstein about to the extent to which an
61 Dworkin recently acknowledged the aspirational quality of his quest for
objectively correct answers to difficult legal questions: "We cannot be sure, before we
look, that constructive interpretation can produce integrity in any particular area of law.
But we have no reason to think, in advance, that it cannot." Ronald Dworkin, Response,
in EXPLORING LAW'S EMPIRE: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF RONALD DWORKIN 291, 304 (Scott
Hershovitz ed., 2006). This passage appears in response to an essay by Jeremy Waldron,
who also highlighted the aspirational quality of Dworkin's quest:
[T]his is where Dworkin should take his stand against the Crits. He should say (and
does say): it is not clear up front that attempts to argue in the mode of law-as-
integrity are doomed to failure. If it were clear, we should have no reason to resist
the siren charms of pragmatism: forget the existing law; ask instead what is best for
the future; and take one's chances on the legitimacy issue .... But [because the law
is] complicate[d] and muddy... there is nothing to do but try, for nothing else will
reveal whether an attempt can succeed while keeping faith with the motivations
behind integrity.
Jeremy Waldron, Did Dworkin Ever Answer the Crits?, in EXPLORING LAW'S
EMPtRE, supra, at 155, 181.
62 DWORKIN, supra note 59, at 54.
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ideal judge would think theoretically about the particular cases that must be
adjudicated. 63 Dworkin emphasizes that occasionally the ideal judge must
invoke higher-level principles to determine the correct resolution to the
particular facts under consideration. Sunstein, by contrast, cautions against
proceeding too quickly to higher-level principles when propositions of law
closer to the facts themselves would identify the right resolution.64 As both
these debaters have recognized recently, there is less disagreement between
them than appeared initially: both would have the ideal judge start with the
facts, resolving cases at the lowest level of principle feasible, but ascending
as necessary when more fact-specific reasoning is insufficient.65
Accordingly, this facts-first approach is what Hercules, as we invoke him,
should undertake in his effort to identify the right resolution to claims based
on Bush v. Gore. In any event, the most important quality that Justice
Hercules would bring to a new claim based on Bush v. Gore would be a
commitment to do what the law requires, regardless of personal views about
which side should win for partisan political reasons or even which side's
legal argument is preferable from one's own personal ideological
perspective.
1. Fact-Dependency and Path-Dependency
Because Hercules would use the facts-first approach just described, we
should begin with the first of the four categories of claims we have identified
since it is the most factually similar to Bush v. Gore itself. Moreover,
because of this factual proximity, it is also the one about which we are most
likely to find meritorious claims. But even within this first category, some
particular claims may be stronger than others because of their particular
facts. Consider, for example, the difference between two versions of local
variation concerning the verification of provisional ballots. (Both of these
versions are discussed in Part II.B. 1 above, in describing this first category of
potential claims based on Bush v. Gore.) First, some local officials check
63 Id. at 66-72; Cass R. Sunstein, Virtues and Verdicts, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May
22, 2006, at 32, 36-37.
64 Sunstein's most recent paper on this topic is Incompletely Theorized Agreements
in Constitutional Law (Univ. of Chicago Law & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 322,
2007), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract-id=957369. See also Cass R. Sunstein,
Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REv. 353 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with
Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1899 (2006).
65 "1 now believe that the differences between Sunstein's views and my own are, as
he says, much less profound than my differences with Posner." DwoRKIN, supra note 59,
at 25. "Dworkin is quite right to say that analogy is blind without principle," but ideally
the Court should "try, whenever it can, to base its decision on the least contentious
principles .... Sunstein, supra note 63, at 37.
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original registration forms, whereas others check only computerized
registration records. Second, some local officials apply more stringent
"matching" standards when comparing information on provisional ballot
envelopes (signatures, names, addresses, and so forth) with the
corresponding information on file in registration records.
These two versions of local variation differ with respect to the point
about practicability mentioned in Bush v. Gore itself. It would not seem
impracticable for a statewide rule that requires local officials to check
whether a provisional voter is registered to specify that this verification
process includes an examination of original registration forms as well as
computerized records. Certainly, specifying this statewide directive in this
way seems no more impracticable than specifying how to treat dimpled or
punctured chads. 66
But specifying standards for matching signatures, names, or other
information supplied by a provisional voter is a much more difficult matter.
What rules should the state adopt for telling local officials how to compare
the handwritten signature on the provisional ballot envelope with the
handwritten signature on file? How close in appearance must each letter be?
And what about the overall shape or direction of a signature? Handwriting
experts may be able to explain their methodologies, but is it possible to write
it in a rule for local election officials to follow when conducting their ballot-
by-ballot reviews? This rulemaking task would seem significantly more
challenging than instructing local officials on what to do with dimpled or
punctured chads.
The same point applies, perhaps even more so, to the matching of names
on provisional ballot envelopes with names of registered voters. Judgment
calls must be made about nicknames, the use of initials rather than names,
spelling variations, and so forth. It might not be possible for a statewide rule
to do much better than to instruct local officials to verify the provisional
ballots when the name of the provisional voter is "substantially equivalent"
to the name of a registered voter at the same address (and the handwriting
appears the same). 67 Therefore, any variation that might result in the
verification of provisional ballots as a result of local officials applying this
rather imprecise standard more or less stringently could arguably be
considered beyond the scope of the Bush v. Gore precedent on the ground of
impracticability.
66 Cass Sunstein has also observed that feasibility, or what he calls "logistical
considerations," must be a factor in any Equal Protection principle emanating from Bush
v. Gore. See Sunstein, supra note 19, at 132.
67 See LEVITr ET AL., supra note 36, at 24 (recommending a "substantial match"
standard).
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Thus, even if we accept Dworkin's "right answer" jurisprudential thesis
in principle, we cannot confidently claim that we know how Justice Hercules
would rule in some of these intensely fact-dependent cases. If a case came
before Justice Hercules involving local variations in the application of
matching protocols for names or signatures on provisional ballot envelopes,
he might ultimately be able to discern the correct answer to the Equal
Protection claim involving those facts. But his answer likely would depend in
large part on expert evidence presented in the case concerning the difficulty
of writing those matching protocols with greater specificity in order to reduce
the degree of local variation in their implementation. He would need to
consider that evidence in light of the practicability factor apparently
incorporated into the Equal Protection analysis under Bush v.Gore, and he
would need to weigh that practicability consideration against other relevant
factors (including, presumably, the degree of local variation caused by the
existing matching protocols and the extent of the normative harm to
adversely affected voters as a result of that variation). Whatever we might
say about how Justice Hercules might decide this Equal Protection claim on
the factual record before him, it is sheer folly to speculate about what Justice
Hercules would do when that factual record does not exist.
When we extrapolate that point from a single case involving matching
protocols for provisional ballots to all the factually divergent scenarios we
have identified across four categories of potential claims based on Bush v.
Gore, we see that it is impossible for us to identify in advance the correct
implementation of Bush v. Gore as a precedent, even if there is a correct way
to implement Bush v. Gore in principle. We must await the actual litigation
of these various Bush v. Gore claims and see what factual records they
present, to make any kind of definitive judgment on what a correct resolution
of them would be. In this respect, identifying the "right answer" to any claim
based on Bush v. Gore is dependent on the crucible of litigation (a point that
Dworkin might accept with respect to any kind of claim, although often it is
easier to identify the right answer to some claims without litigation, in
somewhat the same way that Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle in physics
does not extend to larger-scale objects). Thus, the truth about the
applicability of Bush v. Gore to these novel circumstances must remain
indeterminate in advance of their facts being presented in court.
The future of Bush v. Gore as a precedent is inherently indeterminate in
another-perhaps more profound-way, even accepting the Dworkinian
premise that each claim has a correct answer once it is factually presented in
court. What the correct answer is in any particular case will also depend, in
part, on the order in which these cases arrive in court for judicial resolution.
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In this respect, the development of precedents into a body of law is path-
dependent, 68 a point that Dworkin himself recognizes. 69
Once the first claim based on Bush v. Gore is decided, it becomes a fixed
point that affects the proper disposition of the next case and so forth. In each
new case, because of the doctrine of stare decisis, Justice Hercules does not
revisit the correctness of the previous applications of Bush v. Gore. In this
respect, Justice Hercules is prepared to presume that his predecessors
(including himself) may have made a mistake in applying Bush v. Gore to a
particular Equal Protection claim, but that he is now stuck with that mistake
going forward in determining the correct resolution of each new Equal
Protection claim. (If it helps, one can imagine Justice Hercules coming to the
Court for the first time in each new case, confronted with the handiwork
given to him by the mere mortal Justices who preceded him. Alternatively,
one can say that even if Justice Hercules is the ideal judge, always motivated
by the proper desire to get the law right, it does not mean that he is always
perfect in his efforts.) To invoke one common metaphor, Justice Hercules
weaves each new precedent into the overall fabric of the law, in order to let
that law in its totality determine the outcome of each new case. Doing this for
each new precedent based on Bush v. Gore is no different from doing it for
Bush v. Gore itself: after all, even if Justice Hercules would not have decided
the Equal Protection claim in Bush v. Gore the way that the majority did (an
assumption we shall consider further momentarily), giving force to Bush v.
68 See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REv. 601, 645 (2001) ("The order
in which cases are presented to courts will have a significant influence on the legal rule
selected."). A recent article questions the extent to which path-dependency actually
occurs in constitutional cases decided by the Supreme Court, in large part because of the
Court's limited adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis in constitutional cases. See
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
903 (2005). But this Article does not deny that path-dependency exists even in this
context at least to some extent. More importantly, this Article does not purport to address
the Dworkinian question of how Justice Hercules ideally would decide each new case
based on a proper respect for precedent, rather than how the actual Justices function. And
as Hathaway herself observes, even if the doctrine of stare decisis properly carries less
weight in constitutional cases, the widely shared normative view that it carries
considerable weight in constitutional cases means that, if the Justices are doing their jobs
properly in constitutional cases, these cases will exhibit considerable path-dependency as
well. See Hathaway, supra, at 656.
69 Dworkin builds path-dependency into his jurisprudence by invoking the metaphor
of a "chain novel": judges over time, he says, are in a collective enterprise writing each
new opinion in a way that best honors all their previous opinions, as if they each were
entrusted to writing a new chapter in a joint novel, endeavoring to make each new chapter
tell the best story overall even if they would not have written the same earlier chapters
that their predecessors did. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPiRE 225-38 (1986); RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 111-12 (1977).
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Gore as a precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis is itself to recognize
the path-dependent nature of Equal Protection law.
Thus, the correct outcome to each of the potential Bush v. Gore claims
we have identified, and classified into four categories, depends in part on the
chronological order in which it is judicially resolved. In other words, even a
particular claim that Hercules might find insufficiently strong at the outset-
say, excessively long lines at some polling places, but not others, because of
local choices about the allocation of electoral resources among precincts-
might strengthen over time as a result of a series of intermediary precedents.
Conversely, a claim that seems meritorious now might turn out not to be
because intervening precedents undercut its validity. Yet, not even Hercules
has a crystal ball that will tell him the order in which the merits of these
future Bush v. Gore claims will reach the Supreme Court, in part because of
the inherent unpredictability of both elections and litigation, and in part
because of the Court's discretionary control over its own docket.
Accordingly, as we await the development of case law based on Bush v.
Gore, we cannot comment definitively on what would be its proper
development because of its path-dependency.
2. Would the Ideal Judge Overrule Bush v. Gore?
Even if we confine ourselves to the single strongest possible claim
derived from the precedent of Bush v. Gore, and even if we hypothesize that
this claim is the first one to reach the Supreme Court on the merits, it remains
somewhat tricky to discern what Justice Hercules would identify as the
correct answer. This is true in part because Bush v. Gore was itself such a
controversial decision. Although Justice Hercules embraces the doctrine of
stare decisis, that doctrine permits-indeed requires-the overruling of
precedents in some circumstances. Thus, Justice Hercules must consider the
possibility that the correct resolution of the strongest possible claim based on
the precedent of Bush v. Gore is to reject that claim on the ground that Bush
v. Gore itself should be repudiated. 70
If the Equal Protection holding of Bush v. Gore was so egregiously
mistaken, as many commentators have suggested, maybe it should be
70 Some scholars, however, who originally found themselves aghast over the Equal
Protection holding in Bush v. Gore, have begun to reconcile themselves to that decision
and consider that it, like other apparent aberrations, should be woven into the fabric of
the law. See, e.g., Robert Post, Sustaining the Premise of Legality: Learning to Live with
Bush v. Gore, in BUSH v. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY 96, 109 (Bruce Ackerman
ed., 2002) (describing how, over time, Bush v. Gore "merges with the great mass of
Supreme Court opinions"). In this respect, these scholars appear to have taken Linda
Greenhouse's advice. See Linda Greenhouse, Learning to Live With Bush v. Gore, 4
GREEN BAG 365 (2001).
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jettisoned at the Court's first opportunity to do so.7 1 But overruling Bush v.
Gore would not be like overruling any other case. Precisely because the
Court was so vehemently attacked as being partisan and unprincipled in Bush
v. Gore, it seems important for the Court to avoid saying, "Guess what?
Never mind." That about-face would only confirm the "one ticket only" view
of the decision. This sense of the Court's need to look legitimate accords
with the Court's own understanding of stare decisis articulated in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,72 where concerns over
the potential perception of illegitimacy caused the Court to refuse to overrule
Roe v. Wade.73
Nonetheless, the Casey approach to the doctrine of stare decisis is itself
controversial, and Justice Hercules would need to explore more widely
competing arguments concerning stare decisis in constitutional cases,
including whether Casey deserves to be recognized as a precedent on the
nature of precedent. Examining current discourse on this topic, however,
would not give anyone confidence that it is easy to identify a "right answer"
to the question of whether Justice Hercules should feel bound to follow Bush
v. Gore even if he strongly believed that its Equal Protection holding was an
egregious error.
There is currently a vigorous debate among scholars of constitutional law
on what is the correct doctrine of stare decisis to apply in constitutional
cases. At one extreme, some scholars believe that the Court's prior
precedents should receive virtually no weight: when a Justice believes the
Court's prior interpretation of the Constitution incorrect, fidelity to the
Constitution itself requires dismissing that precedent as erroneous. 74 At the
71 Several scholars have usefully collected the voluminous criticism of Bush v.
Gore. See, e.g., David Cole, The Liberal Legacy of Bush v. Gore, 94 GEO. L.J. 1427,
1451-74 (2006); Abner S. Greene, Is There a First Amendment Defense for Bush v.
Gore?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1643, 1644 (2005); Richard L. Hasen, A Critical Guide
to Bush v. Gore Scholarship, 7 ANN. REv. POL. SCI. 297 (2004). In hindsight, one
wonders whether some portion of the vehemence against the Equal Protection reasoning
of Bush v. Gore is simply misplaced hostility to the more controversial remedial nature of
the decision (that is, to stop the Florida recount rather than permit it to resume using
procedures consistent with Equal Protection). If so, there may be less anathema to the
Equal Protection holding going forward, and thus less impetus for overruling it.
Nonetheless, given the degree to which the Equal Protection holding was condemned in
some academic quarters (see Greene's collection of invectives at the beginning of his
article, supra, at 1644), it is necessary to consider whether that holding is simply too
wrong to remain part of Equal Protection law. For a more measured critique, see Richard
Briffault, Bush v. Gore as an Equal Protection Case, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 325 (2001).
72 505 U.S. 833, 854-69 (1992) joint opinion).
73 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
74 See generally Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 23 (1994).
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other end of the spectrum, there has been a recent resurgence of the view that
the Justices should feel strongly bound by the Court's prior decisions, even if
they believe them erroneous, because of the necessity of ongoing institutional
legitimacy. 75 In the middle are other scholars, who believe that the obligation
to respect precedent carries moderate, but not exceptionally strong, weight in
relation to the Justice's own views about the correct interpretation of the
Constitution.76 Given all this intense disagreement among scholars, even if
there is an objectively correct doctrine of stare decisis for Justice Hercules to
identify, we cannot be so presumptuous as to claim that we know for sure
which doctrine that would be.7 7 (Maybe the very fact that the doctrine of
stare decisis was such a large part of the recent confirmation hearings for
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito would affect Justice Hercules's view
of the proper doctrine of stare decisis to apply going forward-on some kind
of theory that those confirmation hearings involved a popular, or
institutional, ratification of this doctrine and that the Justices were required to
take notice of this ratification-but this idea is tricky because presumably no
Justice, especially not the ideal Justice Hercules, in attempting to discern the
correct meaning of the Constitution, should be affected by political pressure
that Senators may have exerted during the confirmation process.)
Perhaps, then, it is safest to assume that, whatever Hercules's general
theoretical orientation towards respect for precedent in constitutional cases,
he would be disinclined to overrule Bush v. Gore at the earliest opportunity.
The reason would be that, under any doctrine of stare decisis Justice
Hercules would be likely to embrace, there probably would be sufficient
room in that doctrine to justify the proposition that overruling Bush v. Gore
would be an exceptional case, simply because Bush v. Gore itself was an
exceptional case. Most approaches to stare decisis would count as
compelling the objective of avoiding the consequence that only one litigant,
presidential candidate Bush, gets the benefit of that Equal Protection ruling
before it is jettisoned. The arbitrariness of that consequence would seem to
contradict a basic commitment to "the rule of law," a commitment that
presumably Justice Hercules values highly as the ideal judge.
75 See generally Solum, supra note 7; Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare
Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271 (2005).
76 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 115-17 (2001); see
generally Farber, supra note 7; Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723 (1988).
77 Dworkin's own jurisprudence calls for a fairly robust, although not absolute,
adherence to precedent even in the face of a strong conviction that the precedent was
mistaken. See DWORKiN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 69, at 398. But, of course, it is
possible that Dworkin himself may have an incorrect view about the doctrine of stare
decisis that the ideal judge would employ.
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Of course, the Court would not need to overrule Bush v. Gore directly in
order to render it a dead letter as precedent. The Court will never confront
another dimpled or punctured chad, and thus, if there were a principled way
of distinguishing those facts from the case before it, Hercules might approve
nipping the precedent in the bud before it engenders any other doctrinal
damage in Equal Protection law (assuming that Hercules agrees with the
proposition that the Equal Protection holding in Bush v. Gore was itself a
severe mistake).
Consider again the case in which some provisional ballots are rejected
while others are counted because some local officials check original
registration forms while others check only computerized records.78 This case,
indeed, seems the strongest possible one based on the precedent of Bush v.
Gore itself. For the reasons stated already, the concern about any
impracticability of statewide instructions with sufficient specificity to avoid
the disparate treatment in the counting of ballots does not apply on these
facts.
Thus, is there a principled basis for distinguishing this local inequality in
the verification of provisional ballots from the local inequality involving the
dimpled and punctured chads in Bush v. Gore? One suggestion might be to
focus on the fact that Bush v. Gore involved a court-ordered statewide
recount, as the majority opinion there pointedly noted. But this basis for
distinction might not be available, as the verification of provisional ballots
might occur pursuant to a court-ordered statewide recount. In the 2004
gubernatorial election in Washington, for example, if King County had not
voluntarily agreed to count several hundred ballots after double-checking
original registration records, the Republican candidate would have been
certified the winner of that election, and the Democratic candidate would
have filed a judicial contest seeking a statewide recount of wrongfully
excluded ballots.79 If the Washington Supreme Court had then approved a
recount process in which local counties could decide for themselves what
procedures to follow when verifying the registration of provisional voters (a
distinct possibility given that state court's earlier rulings in the context of this
election80), the case could have gone to the U.S. Supreme Court in the exact
same procedural posture as Bush v. Gore itself-only this time a Democratic
78 Again, the only explanation for this unequal treatment of identically situated
provisional ballots is that some local officials interpreted a statewide directive to verify
the provisional voter's registration as requiring only an examination of computerized
records, whereas other local officials interpreted the same unspecific statewide command
as requiring an examination of original registration forms as well.
79 See David Postman, Votes Tallied for Governor, but What's Next is Unclear,
SEATrLE TIMES, Dec. 26, 2004, at B 1.
80 See Wash. State Republican Party v. King County Div. of Records, 103 P.3d 725
(Wash. 2004) (affirming local discretion on whether to count previously rejected ballots).
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candidate would be complaining that the state supreme court had approved a
recount process with insufficiently specified standards, with the consequence
that some local boards were applying a more generous standard that
"recovered more lost votes" (sound familiar?), while other local boards were
applying a less generous standard that caused similarly valid votes to remain
uncounted. If there is to be a principled distinction between this provisional
ballot case and Bush v. Gore itself, it must be based on something other than
the fact that Bush v. Gore involved a court-ordered statewide recount.
The argument might also be made that Bush v. Gore involved ballots cast
by individuals who were unquestionably entitled to vote. The only issue is
whether they had intended their ballot to include a vote for one of the two
presidential candidates when the chad had been marked but not detached. By
contrast, provisional ballots involve voters whose eligibility is in doubt until
verified: that is why they cast a provisional rather than regular ballot.
This argument, however, seems stronger with respect to the problem of
variable standards for matching signatures, names, and other information on
a provisional ballot envelope with comparable registration records. In that
context, if the matching standard is too lenient, it will count provisional
ballots that should have been rejected because the provisional voter was not,
in fact, registered. But in the case of local variation caused by different
degrees of diligence in looking for registration forms that may have been
omitted inadvertently from computerized registration records, this concern
does not arise. There is no question that these provisional voters are eligible
once the extra step is taken to track down their missing original registration
form. Thus, as in Bush v. Gore itself, local variation in the implementation of
an insufficiently specific statewide standard results in the rejection of some
ballots cast by eligible voters when those same ballots would have been
counted if they had been cast in the other localities.
Moreover, in one significant respect, this particular Equal Protection
claim concerning the unequal treatment of equivalent provisional ballots-
i.e., those cast by eligible voters whose registration forms are missing from
computerized records-seems stronger than the one in Bush v. Gore itself. In
this situation, the provisional voters themselves did absolutely nothing to
contribute to the discriminatory rejection of their ballots. They submitted
their registration forms properly. Rather, some form of administrative
problem caused these forms to be missing from the computerized registration
records. By contrast, the voters with dimpled or punctured chads in Bush v.
Gore did not detach the chads as they had been instructed to do. Whether
some of these voters should suffer the unequal treatment of having their
ballots rejected as a result, while others in the same group get the benefit of
having their ballots counted notwithstanding their own mistake, is perhaps a
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debatable matter.81 But the provisional voters in the situation we are
considering bear no portion of the responsibility for the unequal treatment
their provisional ballots receive. 82
Thus, Hercules would seem hard pressed to reject the Equal Protection
claim in this particular provisional ballot situation, given the precedent of
Bush v. Gore. Perhaps Hercules then would sustain this particular Equal
Protection claim, in part to demonstrate that Bush v. Gore is not an
unprincipled, one-case-only decision, but instead extends at least to one
comparable fact pattern involving the unequal treatment of provisional
81 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION,
THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 99-100 (2001).
82 Richard Briffault, after reading an earlier draft of this Article, suggested another
conceivable way of distinguishing this provisional ballot case from the situation in Bush
v. Gore, which might justify confining that precedent so as to deny relief in the
provisional ballot case. The local officials in Florida tasked with implementing the
insufficiently specified standard for counting dimpled and punctured chads knew which
candidate would benefit if the ballot were counted, and they knew this crucial piece of
information for each ballot they inspected. In this way, the lack of specific standards
presented a particularly acute risk of partisan manipulation, as local officials could adjust
how lenient or strict they wished to be in discerning "the intent of the voter" depending
on whether or not they favored the candidate that would benefit from a determination that
the ballot contained a valid presidential vote. By contrast, in the provisional ballot case,
the voter's choice is sealed within the provisional ballot envelope, and therefore a local
official who makes a discretionary judgment about what steps to take to verify the
eligibility of the provisional voter does not know which candidate will benefit if the
provisional ballot is counted.
While this distinction is factually correct as far as it goes, it is by no means clear that
it should make a difference in principle, as Briffault himself recognizes. In most
localities, it is readily apparent which candidate will most likely benefit from
administrative practices that will cause a higher percentage of provisional ballots to be
counted. Therefore, if state law provides an insufficiently specific standard for making
these administrative determinations, the same incentive exists for local officials to be
more lenient or strict in practice depending on which candidate they prefer.
Moreover, even if the risk of partisan manipulation is somewhat greater when the
local officials know for sure which candidate benefits from each administrative decision,
it is not clear why that fact would provide a principled basis for rejecting the claim of
discriminatory disenfranchisement in the provisional ballot case. The voters whose
ballots are rejected because of the local application of a stricter standard suffer this
discrimination in circumstances that present considerable risk of partisan manipulation,
even though there are circumstances presenting yet greater risk of the same problem.
When added to the fact that these provisional voters did nothing to put their ballot at risk
of being rejected-local officials willing to take the extra steps undertaken elsewhere in
the state would discover these voters to be fully eligible, no less so than any conventional
voter whose ballots routinely count-it would seem difficult to say that the Equal
Protection claim of these provisional voters should be denied at the same time as saying
that voters whose dimpled or punctured chads are treated differently from others present
a valid Equal Protection claim.
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ballots. On this view, the proper scope of the Equal Protection principle
generated by Bush v. Gore may end up being quite circumscribed, but it is
not confined to the unique facts of Bush v. Gore alone.
3. How Far Does the Bush v. Gore Principle Extend?
Assuming Hercules would sustain this particular Equal Protection claim,
the question inevitably arises: what about the next strongest fact pattern?
That case might be where some ballots, but not others, are rejected because
of local variations in implementing voter identification requirements that
easily could have been more specific-for example, "current" documents
defined more precisely as "dated within six months before Election Day."
Here, again, there is no dispute about the voter's underlying eligibility,
only whether the voter has provided the correct kind of documentation. The
voter's signature, name, and other information perfectly match the
registration record on file, which is easily found. But the ballot still is
rejected because the utility bill that the voter submits is not "current" in the
eyes of the local officials there, although the same ballot would have been
counted elsewhere, because other local officials interpret "current" more
generously.
This fact pattern also would seem to fall within the same emerging Equal
Protection principle. To be sure, in this situation the voter could have
avoided the problem by submitting a piece of identification that in no way
would have raised a question about whether it was "current" or not. But the
voter's responsibility for the problem seems no greater in this situation than
in Bush v. Gore itself. In fact, submitting a marginally acceptable piece of
identification seems less of a dereliction on the voter's part than failing to
detach a chad as instructed.
And if Hercules would indeed include this ID-related fact pattern within
the Equal Protection principle that emerges from Bush v. Gore, then what
about an ID-related case from the second analytical category: where local
officials reject a ballot because of their mistaken understanding of statewide
ID rules rather than their interpretation of insufficiently specific statewide ID
rules? Here, as before, the voters cannot be blamed at all. If state law
provides that a driver's license is a valid form of voter ID whether it contains
a current address or not, the voter is entirely entitled to submit that form of
ID. It is the local official who incorrectly rejects it based on a misreading of
the state law.
Presumably, however, this situation would not arise in the context of a
court-ordered statewide recount, as the judiciary would insist on a correction
of this local mistake. That point might be enough for Hercules to distinguish
this case from the emerging Bush v. Gore principle if he determined that it
made sense to limit the principle to circumstances involving court-ordered
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recounts. But what if a state's election procedures do not permit court-
ordered recounts-and fail to provide any other kind of remedy for
correcting this discriminatory disenfranchisement because of the misreading
of state statutes in some localities? 83 Would Hercules really conclude that no
Equal Protection violation should be recognized in this situation, even after
accepting the applicability of the Bush v. Gore precedent to the other ID-
related fact pattern? (Remember, considering the path-dependent
incrementalism of judicial reasoning based on precedents, we are assuming
for the moment that the somewhat easier ID case was decided first, setting
the stage for the next one.)
In both situations, state law would permit the local rejection of votes for
lack of adequate ID when the exact same ID would result in those votes
being counted elsewhere in the state. Although the reasons for the local
variance in what officials deem acceptable ID are different in the two
situations-mistake in one, interpretation in the other-the result is the same:
discriminatory disenfranchisement at the hands of local officials.
But if Hercules does accept the Equal Protection claims in both these
situations, then why not accept the claims when the mistake local officials
make is not misreading state law, but failing to provide adequate electoral
resources to local precincts, especially when the mistake prevents voters
from casting ballots altogether, as when the supply of provisional ballots runs
out? Yet, now Hercules appears on the proverbial slippery slope. Would
Hercules, for example, really find an Equal Protection violation if
administrative errors cause the lines at some polling places to last 15 minutes
or a half-hour longer than elsewhere?
Being Hercules, he may be able to handle the slippery slope problem in a
principled way, distinguishing the appropriately winning Equal Protection
claim from the one that simply goes too far.84 Mere mortals like ourselves,
83 Unless a state legislature has enacted a statute giving courts explicit authority to
remedy a mistake in the vote-counting process, the prevailing view among state courts is
that they are powerless to act, as the common law provided no such remedy. See Steven
F. Huefner, Remedying Election Wrongs, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming 2007). In
fact, Ohio has repealed its statutory authority for state court review of vote-counting
mistakes in federal elections, requiring litigants to rely solely upon whatever remedies
might be available in federal court or before Congress. See OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3515.08(A) (LexisNexis Supp. 2006), enacted as part of H.B. 3 (2006):
The nomination or election of any person to any federal office, including the
office of elector for president and vice president and the office of member of
congress, shall not be subject to a contest of election conducted under this chapter.
Contests of the nomination or election of any person to any federal office shall be
conducted in accordance with the applicable provisions of federal law.
84 Cf Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARv. L. REV.
1026 (2003).
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however, have trouble seeing the principled line that he may be able to
discern, especially in advance of the actual case in which the dividing line
gets drawn. The marginal cases, close to either side of the principled dividing
line, are likely to be particularly fact-sensitive, where minor changes in the
evidence in the record might push the case over to the other side of the line.
Thus, the Herculean effort to identify the correct stopping point on the
slippery slope is dependent on the crucible of litigation, for reasons we have
seen previously, and thus cannot be identified in advance (even in principle).
Furthermore, because of path-dependency, the location of the correct
stopping point may depend on whether, among cases within the marginal
zone, a stronger or weaker case is resolved first.
4. Hercules as Quixote?
Perhaps some "theoretical assent" would shed some light on this slippery
slope problem, which we can imagine Hercules confronting. As both
Dworkin and Sunstein acknowledge, the ideal judge will begin to think more
theoretically about the case at hand when focusing closely on the facts does
not yield a ready answer. Since Hercules is likely to be uncertain about
where to draw the line in a case within the marginal zone, even after the
crucible of litigation has fixed the factual record for him, he presumably will
need to think more theoretically about the Equal Protection principle that the
line of cases starting with Bush v. Gore is endeavoring to protect.
Thanks to the work of constitutional scholars already, there are at least
three different ways to understand the Bush v. Gore principle. For the sake of
convenience, these three alternatives have been labeled-from narrowest to
broadest-the First Amendment, Due Process, and Equal Protection
understandings of Bush v. Gore. These labels, however, are a bit misleading,
because all three require inequality in the treatment of voters to establish a
valid claim, and all three are tied to the Equal Protection Clause. The first
two alternatives, however, are subsets of the broadest possible "equality"
understanding of Bush v. Gore by claiming that cases must show an
additional constitutional injury-either of the First Amendment or the Due
Process kind-in order to trigger an Equal Protection violation as a result of
differential treatment of voters.
The First Amendment alternative ties itself to the presence of excessive
administrative discretion as a result of vague laws-and thus would limit
meritorious claims to the first category we have considered, involving
insufficiently specific standards. 85 It is derived from a set of First
85 My Moritz colleague Dan Tokaji is a leading proponent of this First Amendment
alternative, which he accurately characterizes as "First Amendment Equal Protection" to
indicate that it is a distinct species of Equal Protection law based on First Amendment
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Amendment cases in which parade permits and other opportunities for free
expression were denied by local officials pursuant to imprecise rules that
enabled these officials to discriminate among speakers based on hostility to
particular viewpoints. This First Amendment gloss on Bush v. Gore sees a
parallel between this kind of viewpoint discrimination among speakers and
the discrimination among ballots to be counted because of partisan
favoritism.
The Due Process reading of Bush v. Gore would encompass this first
category of claims, based on insufficiently specified standards, and would
extend to the second category as well, involving mistaken implementations
of state law. This Due Process alternative seeks to protect voters from having
their ballots arbitrarily discarded without any kind of appropriate procedures
or consideration. 86 The rejection of some ballots because some local officials
could not read the relevant state law correctly, and thereby misbelieved that a
driver's license must contain a current address to qualify as valid voter ID,
surely would count as a kind of arbitrary denial of the fundamental right to
vote that would contradict the Due Process reading of Bush v. Gore.
The so-called Equal Protection theory, the broadest, would encompass
claims recognized by both the First Amendment and Due Process
alternatives, but also go further to invalidate any unjustifiable local variations
in voting opportunities. 87 Thus, it would extend beyond the first two
categories of claims, those based on excessive discretion or mistake, to
embrace claims in the third category, and perhaps even the fourth as well.
Rather than being limited to any type of inequality among eligible voters in
the counting (or even casting) of ballots-or, perhaps more precisely, in the
type of administrative decision that causes this electoral inequality
(discretionary interpretation, misinterpretation, resource misallocation, and
so forth)-this Equal Protection reading of Bush v. Gore would distinguish
meritorious from unmeritorious claims based on the severity of electoral
values. See Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amendment Equal Protection: On Discretion,
Inequality, and Participation, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2409 (2003). My former co-clerk Abner
Greene has also propounded a version of this alternative: Greene, supra note 71, at 1654-
96.
86 See Einer Elhauge, The Lessons of Florida 2000, POL'Y REv., Dec. 2001 & Jan.
2002, at 15; Roy A. Schotland, In Bush v. Gore: Whatever Happened to the Due Process
Ground?, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 211 (2002).
87 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law
in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 377, 395 (2001) (describing how, if the Equal
Protection principle were taken seriously, it would invalidate different voting
technologies in different counties). See also Clifford A. Jones, Out of Guatemala?:
Election Law Reform in Florida and the Legacy of Bush v. Gore in the 2004 Presidential
Election, 5 ELECTION L.J. 121, 136 (2006); Saphire & Moke, supra note 11; Note,
"Arbitrary and Disparate" Obstacles to Democracy: The Equal Protection Implications
of Bush v. Gore on Election Administration, 19 J.L. & POL. 299 (2003).
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inequality, balanced against the strength of the government's justification for
the administrative practice that causes this inequality.
Is it possible to identify which of these three alternatives Hercules would
adopt as his own view of the best theoretical understanding of Bush v. Gore?
Not by reading the academic literature on the topic, as all three alternatives
have their professorial proponents. One would have to enter this scholarly
debate in order to argue why the alternative one prefers is, in truth, the
objectively correct way to read Bush v. Gore. But one should not be so
presumptuous to think that one's arguments, however convincing to oneself,
will yield academic accord on the topic.
For myself, I am quite torn between the Due Process and Equal
Protection alternatives. I find the First Amendment reading, although
intellectually sophisticated and creative, arbitrarily narrow. Narrowness is its
strongest virtue, as anyone predisposed to think Bush v. Gore was wrongly
decided as an Equal Protection case would be inclined to favor the narrowest
way to understand the principle emanating from that precedent. It is not clear
to me, however, why distinctive freedom-of-expression concerns should be
controlling with respect to the unequal treatment in the casting of ballots by
equally eligible citizens. To be sure, casting a ballot has an expressive
element to it and thus is worthy of First Amendment protection. But the
constitutional protection of equality in voting extends to circumstances that
do not depend on the expressive nature of voting. After all, there is no need
for the doctrine of Reynolds v. Sims, with its requirement of equally populous
legislative districts, in order to protect the expressive dimension of casting a
ballot. The vote in favor of a candidate expresses the voter's support for that
candidate to the same extent, whether that candidate represents a district of
one thousand or one million.88
Likewise, the harm to electoral equality from insufficiently specified
state standards extends beyond the distinctive First Amendment concern of
viewpoint discrimination, or partisan bias, resulting from the discretionary
interpretation of those imprecise standards. Even when local election boards
are structured in a strictly bipartisan way, with equal numbers of Democrats
and Republicans (as in Ohio), there is the problem of some local boards
adopting a stricter interpretation of an imprecise statewide standard, while
other local boards opt for a more lenient interpretation. The eligible voters
whose provisional ballots are rejected because their local board checked only
its computerized records, whereas provisional voters elsewhere benefited
from the willingness of their boards to double-check original registration
88 Indeed, this proposition is considerably stronger than the analogous one that the
Court accepted in Buckley v. Valeo: that a $1000 contribution to a candidate's campaign
expresses support for that candidate to roughly the same extent as a $1 million
contribution. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
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forms, are denied a basic equality of electoral participation regardless of the
risk that the local boards adopted their differing interpretations of the
imprecise state rule because of local partisan biases. The First Amendment
reading of Bush v. Gore does not capture the real reason for protecting
equally eligible voters from discriminatory disenfranchisement caused by
local variation in the interpretation of insufficiently specific statewide
standards. 89
For similar reasons, it is tempting to say that the Equal Protection
reading of Bush v. Gore, or at least some suitably cautious version of it, must
be the correct one. Equality of opportunity for all equally eligible citizens to
cast a ballot that counts is, after all, the democratic value that animates this
exercise in constitutional interpretation. That electoral equality can be fully
vindicated only through an Equal Protection interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
The problem, however, is that this Equal Protection reading of Bush v.
Gore is the most unbounded, leaving the most room for variability in judicial
reasoning in each new case. The Equal Protection inquiry, at least so far as it
has been identified in precedents up to this point, is to balance the severity of
the inequality against the strength of the government's justification for its
administrative practice. This amorphous balancing test, entirely dependent on
the facts of each case, engenders unpredictability in an area of law that
arguably is in special need of clear rules in advance: the rules and procedures
for counting votes should be set in stone, insofar as humanly possible, before
the votes are cast.
This problem does not disappear even if judges exercise considerable
self-restraint when employing this Equal Protection balancing test. We can
imagine judges adopting a presumption against invalidating administrative
practices based on this Equal Protection interpretation, limiting judicial
intervention to cases of egregious inequalities where the government's
justifications are weak. Still, if the test for judicial intervention turns on such
indeterminate factors as egregiousness or weakness, there will be many cases
in which it is uncertain whether or not this test is met.
The Due Process reading of Bush v. Gore has the advantage of providing
some more constraint, and therefore predictability, to the scope of its
principle. To be sure, the test for a Due Process violation is also malleable,
focusing on the arbitrariness of the administrative practice. But it also
89 To be sure, where local election boards are not structured in a strictly bipartisan
way, the risk of local partisanship exists with respect to the treatment of provisional
ballots, just as it did in the Florida recount situation. See supra note 82. The point here is
that equivalently eligible provisional voters, some of whose ballots are rejected only
because of local variation in the extent of their verification procedures, should receive the
benefit of the same Equal Protection principle, even if the structure of a state's local
election boards is not inherently partisan.
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purports to cabin judicial intervention to those circumstances in which
electoral administration has been procedurally defective. If this Due Process
approach prevails, it would not be enough to say that the discriminatory
treatment of voters with respect to the casting or counting of ballots was
substantively unfair. Rather, it would be necessary to claim that this
discriminatory treatment resulted from an administrative decision or practice
that was flawed in some procedural way.
Whether the benefits of cabining the Bush v. Gore principle in this way
outweigh the costs is difficult, if not impossible, to say in advance of actual
cases-even though it would be desirable to settle this issue in advance. It is
hard to know in advance what claims the Equal Protection alternative would
find meritorious that the Due Process alternative would not, or how
important to the vindication of constitutional values it would be to provide
relief to these particular claims. Thus, the crucible of actual litigation seems
necessary, not only to set the factual record upon which the Bush v. Gore
principle will be applied, but also to make a definitive judgment about which
alternative understanding of that principle should be chosen to apply to that
factual record.
When this theoretical uncertainty is added to the others that we have
considered, including the path-dependent development of decisional law, the
effort to speculate about how Hercules would handle the slippery slope of
potentially meritorious Bush v. Gore claims seems ultimately quixotic.
D. How Would Actual Justices Decide New Bush v. Gore Claims?
Hercules does not sit on the Supreme Court. Flesh-and-blood humans do.
Therefore, in thinking about the future of Bush v. Gore, maybe we would do
better to consider what the Justices themselves are likely to do, if they were
to confront the merits of a new Bush v. Gore claim.
Doing so, however, compounds the challenge in at least one respect:
because there are nine Justices who may have different views on how to
apply the Equal Protection precedent of Bush v. Gore in future cases, it is
necessary to consider each of the Justices individually, or at least paired with
those other Justices likely to share their perspective on the matter. When
combined with the wide array of potential fact patterns presenting novel Bush
v. Gore claims, the challenge of predicting how each individual Justice
would rule on each of these claims becomes essentially impossible. Yet
simply to get a feel for whether Bush v. Gore has any future at all as a
precedent for the recognition of new Equal Protection claims, it is worth
speculating about how each Justice might rule if faced with the strongest
claim we have identified: local variation in the verification of provisional
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ballots caused by insufficiently specific statewide standards on what
registration records local officials must check.90
1. Justices Stevens & Ginsburg
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg did not find an Equal Protection violation
in Bush v. Gore itself, and thus one might think they would be disinclined to
extend that precedent or even willing to overrule it. Yet both these Justices
might be more sympathetic to the Equal Protection claim in the provisional
ballot case for a reason discussed above: the provisional voters whose ballots
are rejected in this situation are in no way responsible for the discriminatory
disenfranchisement they suffer, whereas the voters in Bush v. Gore could
have prevented their problem by detaching their chads as instructed. In that
sense, the Bush v. Gore voters had a full opportunity to cast a ballot that
would have been counted, so they were not completely disenfranchised in the
same way that the provisional voters in this situation are.
Unlike in Bush v. Gore, moreover, there is no doubt about the electoral
choice these eligible voters made when casting their provisional ballots.
There would be no obstacle to, or indeed basis for, rejecting these ballots if
only local officials had taken the same steps to check their registration
records as officials elsewhere in the state. This outright disenfranchisement
of some eligible voters might strike Justices Stevens and Ginsburg as akin to
the discriminatory disenfranchisement in Harper v. Virginia State Board of
Elections,91 the Poll Tax Case, and thus much more deserving of a remedy
than the varying interpretations of ambiguous ballots in Bush v. Gore.
Indeed, Justice Stevens has since suggested as much in an opinion he
issued on Election Day in 2004.92 The case concerned the threat of
widespread partisan challenges to the eligibility of targeted voters at polling
places. Although Justice Stevens refused an emergency request to intervene
in the case just several hours before polls were about to open, he went out of
his way to express his "faith that the elected officials ... will carry out their
responsibilities in a way that will enable qualified voters to cast their
90 Some observers have speculated that the Supreme Court will never cite Bush v.
Gore as a precedent, perhaps out of embarrassment. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, Has Bush v.
Gore Become the Case That Must Not Be Named?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2006, at A18;
Chad Flanders, Please Don't Cite This Case! The Precedential Value of Bush v. Gore,
115 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 141 (2006), http://thepocketpart.org/2006/11/07
/flanders.html. My view, however, is different. The absence of citation to Bush v. Gore
thus far is evidence only of the fact that no new case before the Supreme Court has yet
directly implicated that precedent. The true test will come when one does.
91 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
92 Spencer v. Pugh, 543 U.S. 1301 (2004) (Stevens, Circuit Justice).
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ballots." 93 It would seem that the failure of some election officials to take the
steps that would verify a provisional voter's eligibility, when election
officials elsewhere in the state were willing and able to take those same
steps, would amount to a breach of this faith.
Thus, had Bush v. Gore never occurred, and were this discriminatory
disenfranchisement of provisional voters before the Supreme Court, Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg would likely find an Equal Protection violation,
relying on Harper and related Warren Court precedents. 94 It is conceivable,
although unlikely, that these Justices would let the intervening existence of
Bush v. Gore undercut the Equal Protection claim they otherwise would
recognize. These real world Justices, like the hypothetical Hercules, are
sensitive to path-dependency. Even so, whatever negative shadow Bush v.
Gore would cast over this new Equal Protection claim involving provisional
ballots would seem pale in comparison with the strength of the claim itself.
After all, Bush v. Gore accepted rather than rejected the Equal Protection
claim there, and while Justices Stevens and Ginsburg objected to that ruling,
their hostility to the Equal Protection holding in Bush v. Gore would not
seem so great as to cause them to deny another Equal Protection claim they
would sustain independently of that precedent.95
Furthermore, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg are not averse to relying on
precedents with which they originally disagreed when doing so suits their
purposes. Justice Stevens, for example, has relied extensively on Shaw v.
Reno,96 an Equal Protection holding he especially objected to, to support his
own position in the related, but different, context of political rather than
racial gerrymandering. 97 And Justice Stevens, writing for himself and Justice
93 Id. at 1302-03.
94 See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
95 Indeed, Justice Stevens's dissent in Bush v. Gore acknowledged some sympathy
towards the Equal Protection claim in the case even though he ultimately found it
unmeritorious. "Admittedly," he said, "the use of differing substandards for determining
voter intent in different counties employing similar voting systems may raise serious
concerns." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 126 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). He went on to
say, however, that the presence of a "single impartial magistrate" in the recount context
"alleviated-if not eliminated [these concerns]," and that there needs to be some
flexibility in applying the Equal Protection Clause to the problems of voting
administration lest all electoral inequalities in practice end up federal constitutional
violations. Id. This reasoning hardly indicates adamant hostility towards the Equal
Protection holding in Bush v. Gore.
96 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
97 In his dissent in Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004), after quoting Shaw and
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), the case extending Shaw to racially motivated
maps that are not superficially anomalous, Justice Stevens asserted: "In my view, the
[Vol. 68:925
FUTURE OF BUSH V GORE
Ginsburg in Clingman v. Beaver98 to support a political party's right to free
association, invoked the authority of California Democratic Party v. Jones,99
a case in which they together dissented. Thus, we can surmise that both
Justice Stevens and Justice Ginsburg would be quite comfortable citing Bush
v. Gore to uphold an Equal Protection claim they wish to vindicate.100
2. Justices Souter & Breyer
Justices Souter and Breyer agreed with the Court in Bush v. Gore that the
differential treatment of dimpled and punctured chads presented an Equal
Protection problem (although Justice Breyer at least did not go quite so far as
to say that this Equal Protection "problem" amounted to an Equal Protection
violation).'0l They based their dissents, however, on the Court's remedy,
same standards should apply to claims of political gerrymandering, for the essence of a
gerrymander is the same regardless of whether the group is identified as political or
racial." Vieth, 541 U.S. at 335 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also League of United Latin
Am. Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2642 (2006) [hereinafter LULAC] (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting, with regards to the dismantling of District
24, "I would apply the standard[s] fashioned by the Court in its racial gerrymandering
cases").
98 544 U.S. 581, 612-13 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also id. at 615
(specifically citing Jones for the proposition that "it is no business of the State to tell a
political party what its message should be, how it should select its candidates, or how it
should form coalitions to ensure electoral success," a proposition that he rejected in Jones
itself).
99 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
100 Jan Crawford Greenburg asserts in her new book: "The Court's liberal justices
still believe Bush v. Gore was a political decision, and they privately question whether
the outcome would have been the same if it had been Gore v. Bush, with the Republican
candidate calling for the recount." JAN CRAWFORD GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT: THE
INSIDE STORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
31 (2007). It is difficult to know what to make of this assertion, in part because
Greenburg does not attribute this belief to any "liberal" Justice by name or provide any
further details. Moreover, this assertion contradicts previous suggestions that Bush v.
Gore dissenters on the Court had reconciled themselves to the decision and moved on to
tackle other cases and issues. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Bush v. Gore: Filed, Not
Forgotten, USA TODAY, Dec. 13, 2001, at A3:
The nine justices appear to have moved past the tension created by the 5-4 decision
and have moved into a new term.... The justices who mentioned Bush vs. Gore in
speeches this year-either to defend or criticize the ruling-now say privately that it
causes little tension among them today.
Id. See also Greenhouse, supra note 70. In any event, even if this assertion were true,
it would not undermine the observation that Justices Stevens and Ginsburg likely would
be willing to use the precedent to support an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause
with which they agreed.
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which shut down Florida's attempt to recount the ballots on the eve of the
congressional "safe-harbor" deadline for settling disputes concerning a
state's Electoral College delegation. 10 2 Thus, these two Justices might have
little hesitation in extending the Equal Protection precedent of Bush v. Gore
to a case involving the discriminatory disenfranchisement of provisional
voters, especially if this new provisional voter case arose in a context
divorced from the "safe-harbor" deadline of a presidential election (as it
easily could have in the 2004 gubernatorial election in Washington).
3. Justices Scalia & Thomas
Justices Scalia and Thomas joined the Court's opinion in Bush v. Gore
that found the Equal Protection violation, but there is reason to think that
they might be reluctant to rely on it and might even be willing to repudiate it.
Justice Scalia is rumored to have disparaged the Equal Protection reasoning
of the Court's opinion, although he has denied the rumor, saying instead that
he simply expressed a preference for the Article II alternative in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's Bush v. Gore concurrence (which both Justices Scalia and
101 Souter stated: "I can conceive of no legitimate state interest served by these
differ[ent] treatments of the expressions of voters' fundamental rights. The differences
appear wholly arbitrary." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 134 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter also characterized Bush's Equal Protection argument as "meritorious." Id.
at 133. Breyer, more tentatively, said, "[T]he absence of a uniform, specific standard to
guide the recounts ... does implicate principles of fundamental fairness ... I agree that,
in these very special circumstances, basic principles of fairness may well have counseled
the adoption of a uniform standard to address the problem." Id. at 145-46 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Some have suggested that the majority in Bush v. Gore distorted the position
of these two dissenters by stating that "[s]even Justices of the Court agree that there are
constitutional problems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court that
demand a remedy." Id. at 111 (per curiam). See, e.g., DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN &
RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 124 n.i (3d ed. 2004) ("Is
the Court correct that [Souter and Breyer] agree that there is a constitutional problem?").
102 It has been suggested that, during the Court's time-pressured internal
deliberations over Bush v. Gore on the day of the oral argument (Monday, December 11),
Justice Breyer, and perhaps also Justice Souter, expressed support for Bush's Equal
Protection argument as a strategic maneuver in the hope that either Justice Kennedy or
Justice O'Connor would agree to a remand that would permit a recount to continue. See
JEFFREY TOOBIN, Too CLOSE To CALL 264 (2001) ("Breyer in particular thought he could
craft a compromise that might nudge Kennedy, or, less likely, O'Connor, over to his
side."); Linda Greenhouse, Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justices, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 2001, at Al ("Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter, was offering this [Equal
Protection] option in an effort to sway Justice Kennedy and perhaps Justice O'Connor.").
To my knowledge, no one has suggested that this strategy was insincere, with the
implication that Justices Breyer and Souter would disavow the Equal Protection concerns
they expressed in Bush v. Gore if those same concerns were germane in a future case.
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Thomas also joined). 10 3 More recently, however, Justice Scalia has been
quoted as defending the Equal Protection holding of Bush v. Gore: "Counting
somebody else's dimpled chad and not counting my dimpled chad is not
giving equal protection of the law."' 10 4
In any event, the Equal Protection holding of Bush v. Gore seems so out-
of-step with their approach to the Equal Protection Clause in other election
cases that it seems difficult to imagine that Justices Scalia and Thomas would
wish to extend that holding even to other cases involving unequal treatment
of ballots resulting from insufficiently specific statewide standards, which is
the category of claims closest to Bush v. Gore itself.10 5 The most obvious
point of comparison is Vieth v. Jubelirer,106 as well as the follow-up of
LULAC v. Perry,10 7 where Justices Scalia and Thomas insist that the political
question doctrine blocks reliance on the Equal Protection Clause because any
standard derivable from the Clause would be too imprecise to permit judicial
intervention. Imprecision, however, is an unavoidable characteristic of the
Equal Protection principle vindicated in Bush v. Gore, even if that principle
is limited to the narrowest category of insufficiently specified standards that
cause local variation in the counting of similar ballots. As we have seen, at
the very least, implementing this Equal Protection principle requires case-by-
case judgments about whether it would have been "practicable" for state law
to adopt a more specific rule, and this practicability standard itself is by no
means precise. 108
103 Tony Mauro, Scalding Scalia, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 13, 2004, at 3.
104 Glenn Blain, Scalia, Speaking at Jona, Defends Decision to Halt 2000 Florida
Recount, J. NEWS, Jan. 24, 2007, at lB. Justice Scalia's comment came during a Q&A
session after a speech he delivered. The original report was picked up by the Associated
Press and republished widely.
105 Cf Richard L. Hasen, No Exit?: The Roberts Court and the Future of Election
Law, 57 S.C. L. REV. 669, 686 (2006):
While we do not know how the Supreme Court will resolve these kinds of
claims if and when they are considered, a Supreme Court made up of a conservative
majority is unlikely to read the Equal Protection Clause expansively so as to open up
the courts to many Equal Protection challenges to the nuts and bolts of elections.
Indeed, it was this instinct that a conservative Court would not read the Equal
Protection Clause expansively which made the holding of Bush v. Gore so
surprising.
106 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality).
107 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
108 It has been suggested by one reader that the problem of indeterminacy in the
gerrymander context is qualitatively different from the Equal Protection holding of Bush
v. Gore because in the gerrymander context there is not even an identifiable standard to
apply, whereas Bush v. Gore merely involves the application of a fuzzy standard. That
suggestion, however, is incorrect. In Vieth, Justice Scalia acknowledges that Justice
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Similarly, this Equal Protection principle appears to require an inquiry
into whether the statewide standard that causes local variation is unspecific
enough to trigger a federal constitutional problem. A modest amount of
vagueness in the statewide standard might be constitutionally tolerable, even
if it might be "practicable" to reduce the degree of vagueness somewhat
more. On this view of the Equal Protection principle, degree-of-vagueness
would be a kind of threshold inquiry, which the complainant would need to
overcome, in order to advance to the "practicability" inquiry. Alternatively,
degree-of-vagueness and practicability might be commingled inquiries, only
causing the overall Equal Protection principle to be that much more
imprecise itself. Either way, this Equal Protection principle has the same sort
of indeterminacy as the "undue burden" test of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey109 or the "congruence and proportionality" test of the Court's cases
interpreting Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 Justices Scalia
and Thomas are especially averse to these kinds of indeterminate
constitutional tests, and although the Bush v. Gore principle (on this
narrowest understanding) is directed against inappropriate indeterminacy in
state law, the use of an indeterminate constitutional test to invalidate
imprecise state statutes would presumably strike Justice Scalia and Thomas
as improper judicial usurpation of legislative prerogatives. Especially in the
politically sensitive sphere of voting administration, Justices Scalia and
Thomas would ordinarily say that if the Court itself can do no better than the
legislature in articulating clear rules, then the Court should invoke the
political question doctrine to keep its hands off.
What, then, would Justices Scalia and Thomas ultimately do if forced to
rule on the merits of the strongest possible claim that might arise under the
precedent of Bush v. Gore, again the case of discriminatory rejection of
provisional ballots resulting from different local interpretations of an
indisputably vague verification standard that easily could have been more
precise ("local officials must check original registration cards as well as
computerized records")? This one seems especially difficult to predict. On
the one hand, they might go along with the finding of an Equal Protection
violation in this case, accepting the Equal Protection ruling in Bush v. Gore
as not worth overruling. If they saw this provisional ballot case as clearly
Breyer's dissent offers a normatively attractive principle for identifying unconstitutional
gerrymanders: those that undemocratically deprive the majority of their right to control a
state's legislative process. Justice Scalia, however, rejects Justice Breyer's approach
because it fails operationally to determine when a gerrymander's impendence of majority
rule is sufficiently severe to warrant judicial invalidation. In this respect, the
indeterminacy of Justice Beyer's anti-entrenchment principle is qualitatively similar to
the indeterminacy of Bush v. Gore.
109 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520-21 (2004) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
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coming within the scope of the Equal Protection holding in Bush v. Gore, no
matter how inappropriately indeterminate that Equal Protection holding may
be, then they could accept the finding of an Equal Protection violation in this
provisional ballot case without viewing it as really being an extension of
Bush v. Gore at all. But they might try to say that the discriminatory rejection
of provisional ballots is different in principle from the discriminatory
rejection of dimpled or punctured chads, as difficult (and apparently un-
Herculean) as doing so would be on these particularly compelling facts
(again, no fault of these eligible voters that their valid registrations were
missing from computerized records). Or perhaps these two Justices might
disavow the Equal Protection ruling of Bush v. Gore, acknowledging that
they should have joined just the separate Article II concurrence.
But if Justice Scalia's recent defense of the Equal Protection holding is
accurate, as quoted in the media, then he would seem prepared to apply this
holding to analogous circumstances, like the provisional ballot case.
4. Justices Roberts & Alito
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, of course, were not on the Court
at the time of Bush v. Gore. Therefore, it is difficult to assess their receptivity
to Equal Protection claims based on that precedent. During their confirmation
hearings, however, they indicated that they would respect the Equal
Protection holding of Bush v. Gore under the doctrine of stare decisis. In a
written response to a question from Senator Kennedy, Chief Justice Roberts
went so far as to say that "the Equal Protection principles at issue in Bush v.
Gore may be implicated in future cases" and that the cautionary language of
the Court's opinion there, in his view, "was not meant to deprive the decision
of all precedential weight."' 1 Presumably, then, Chief Justice Roberts would
be prepared to apply the authority of Bush v. Gore in a case that he saw
falling within the scope of its holding, even narrowly understood.
To be sure, neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Alito said anything
in the context of their confirmation hearings that would preclude either of
them from overruling Bush v. Gore if, based on their best judgment at the
time, a specific case came before them on the Supreme Court and they
determined that the justifications for doing so outweighed the respect for
111 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., to be Chief
Justice of the United States, Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th Cong. 631 (2005). In
response to a question from Senator Kohl during his own hearing, Justice Alito similarly
stated: "[T]he Equal Protection ground that the majority relied on in Bush v. Gore does
involve principles that could come up in future elections and in future cases."
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr., to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 109th
Cong. 386 (2006).
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precedent demanded by stare decisis. But the general concern that Chief
Justice Roberts has expressed that the Court's decisions appear objective and
grounded in the rule of law would suggest that he would not easily agree to
overrule Bush v. Gore as an arbitrary and capricious mistake."12
Consequently, if the kind of provisional ballot case that we have been
considering came before the Court on the merits (presumably after a grant of
certiorari by at least four of the Justices), we can expect that Chief Justice
Roberts would rule in favor of sustaining the Equal Protection claim on the
authority of the Bush v. Gore precedent. Justice Alito would be likely to do
the same, both because he appears to share the Chief Justice's general
jurisprudential perspectives and because he might be inclined to follow the
Chief's lead in a case as institutionally significant as one involving the
precedential status of Bush v. Gore.
5. Justice Kennedy
That leaves Justice Kennedy, the purported primary author of the
majority opinion in Bush v. Gore (although it was issued per curiam). 113 That
attribution makes sense as its reasoning and style are characteristic of his
other opinions, including those involving the application of the Equal
Protection Clause to election cases. For example, in LULAC v. Perry he
rejects the plaintiffs proposed test for political gerrymanders using language
that echoes the condemnation of the recount process in Bush v. Gore.114
As the author of the majority opinion in Bush v. Gore, Justice Kennedy
would be particularly predisposed in a future case to show that precedent to
be principled. Even assuming that he only shares responsibility with Justice
O'Connor for the majority opinion in Bush v. Gore, Justice Kennedy still
would want the world to see that the decision there was not an ad hoc
contrivance to award the presidency to George W. Bush, but rather a
principled interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that can benefit other
112 Transcript of Chief Justice John G. Roberts's remarks at the Fair and
Independent Courts Conference at Georgetown University (Sept. 28, 2006),
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/documents/CoJ092906-roberts.pdf; Joanna Suarez,
Lecture Series-Chief Justice Roberts, http://www6.miami.edu/lUMH/CDA/UMHMain
/0,1770,8543-1 ;51457-3,00.html.
113 See, e.g., Jeffery Rosen, In Lieu of Manners, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 4, 2001, at
46, 50. See also Toobin, supra note 102, at 265 (noting that "the wording was mostly
Kennedy's"); GREENBURG, SUPREME CONFLICT, supra note 100, at 176 (describing how
Court's opinion was "Kennedy's handiwork").
114 Compare Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 107 (2000) (per curiam) ("This is not a
process with sufficient guarantees of Equal Protection.") with LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594,
2602 (2006) ("A test that treats these two similarly effective power plays in such different
ways does not have the reliability [that] appellants ascribe to it.").
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plaintiffs-Democratic or Republican-in analogous circumstances. Thus,
more than any other member of the Court, Justice Kennedy would likely be
supportive of an Equal Protection claim in a case like the provisional ballot
one that we have been considering.
6. Adding Up the Votes on the Supreme Court
Our review of the individual Justices reveals that there might even be a
unanimous vote in favor of recognizing a valid Equal Protection claim in this
kind of provisional ballot case. Perhaps unanimity should not be surprising in
a case involving the strongest imaginable claim based on the precedent of
Bush v. Gore. Such unanimity would certainly please Chief Justice Roberts,
who has been cajoling his colleagues to sublimate their own personal views
about the right answer in each case (their own efforts to play Hercules?) out
of deference to the authority of the Court itself as an institution. 
15
As our review of the individual Justices has also shown, however,
unanimity is far from certain in even this strongest possible case based on
Bush v. Gore. Justices Scalia and Thomas might dissent, as conceivably
could Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, or even Chief Justice Roberts or Justice
Alito. Of course, if all of these Justices voted to overrule Bush v. Gore, or to
reject the new Equal Protection claim because provisional ballots are
distinguishable from dimpled and punctured chads (for some not-readily-
apparent reason), then the Court's vote would be 6-3 against the claim. But
the most likely outcome, based on our prognostications, would be a 9-0, or
perhaps a 7-2, vote in favor of this kind of claim.
7. How Far Would the Current Court Extend Bush v. Gore?
Assuming that this analysis of the current Justices on the Supreme Court
is correct, and we can identify one kind of claim premised on the precedent
of Bush v. Gore that a majority of these Justices would likely accept, the
speculation (as with Hercules) becomes: what about the next possible fact
pattern along the continuum between those closest and farthest to Bush v.
Gore itself? The case of locally divergent interpretations of what qualifies as
a "current" ID, which also causes unequal counting of identical ballots,
seems close enough to the first case, as well as to Bush v. Gore itself, that a
majority of the Court presumably would also sustain this claim, perhaps
again even unanimously.
115 Tony Mauro, Roberts Takes His Time in Reshaping Supreme Court, N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 27, 2006, at 1. See also Tony Mauro, Scalia, Breyer Debate Unanimity on the High
Court, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 14, 2006, at 4.
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But what about the case of discriminatory disenfranchisement caused by
local misinterpretations of a state's voter ID law? Or a case of discriminatory
disenfranchisement because of local mismanagement in failing to supply
precincts with adequate numbers of provisional ballots? Although one cannot
be certain, one surmises that (after Justices Scalia and Thomas) Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Alito would be the ones most ready to distinguish Bush
v. Gore and limit that precedent to a narrow category of cases. This surmise
stems from their general preference for judicial restraint in cases involving
the application of the Equal Protection Clause to state election procedures.
Their position in LULAC, rejecting the political gerrymander claim there,
accords with this general posture. Therefore, along with Justices Scalia and
Thomas, these two would be the ones most inclined to say that the Equal
Protection principle of Bush v. Gore has no applicability outside the context
of a court-ordered recount, even if the consequence is to leave unremedied
discriminatory disenfranchisements caused by local administrative errors.
(But Justice Scalia's tantalizing recent quote suggests otherwise: to
paraphrase what he said only slightly, counting someone else's ballot
submitted with a driver's license that has an old address, and not counting
my ballot submitted with a driver's license that has an old address, is not
giving equal protection of the law.)
In fact, Justice Kennedy might be more inclined to narrow the scope of
Bush v. Gore in this way than any of the dissenters there. As we have seen,
the majority opinion itself emphasized the fact that the Equal Protection issue
arose in the context of a court-ordered recount. Thus, as its primary author,
Justice Kennedy might easily see it as consistent with that opinion to confine
its principle to the unequal counting of ballots caused by insufficiently
specific standards in the context of a court-ordered recount.
By contrast, despite their dissenting votes in Bush v. Gore, Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg (and especially Justices Souter and Breyer) might be
unwilling to let stand unredressed the discriminatory disenfranchisement of
eligible voters as a result of local administrative errors. Such arbitrary and
unjustified inequality, especially with respect to so fundamental an interest as
the ability of eligible citizens to cast a ballot that counts, would seem
inconsistent with Justice Stevens's general interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause as imposing upon the states a duty to govern impartially.116
As the other Bush v. Gore dissenters can be understood to share with Justice
Stevens this general approach to the Equal Protection Clause, even if they
116 See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 327 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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might not express it in the same way in every case, they also would be likely
to invalidate discriminatory disenfranchisements caused by local mistakes.' 1 7
To be sure, the Bush v. Gore dissenters can hardly be expected to view
favorably any claim of local variation in electoral opportunities that might
arise in the wake of Bush v. Gore. Where local variation results, not from
mistake or mismanagement, but from the anticipated implementation of a
cogent statewide policy in favor of local discretion, then these Justices-
along with the others---can be expected to uphold the local variation as
justifiable after being subjected to appropriately rigorous judicial scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause."18 For this reason, the claims involving
the use of different voting technologies in different localities within a state
seem least likely to prevail if they were to come before the current Court.
This is true especially where the local choice of different technologies is
among options all of which are readily defensible even if not identical (say,
between optical scan machines, on the one hand, and VVPAT-equipped
touchscreens, on the other). 19 In that situation, the Court's rejection of an
Equal Protection claim based on Bush v. Gore is likely to be unanimous.
But with respect to cases falling towards the middle of the continuum,
like those involving discriminatory disenfranchisement caused by local
mistake or mismanagement, Justice Kennedy might well occupy the middle
position on the Court, as he did in LULAC and will in many other cases given
the Court's current composition. As to these middle cases on the Bush v.
Gore continuum, Justice Kennedy's vote cannot be taken for granted one
way or the other. He might vote to narrow his own precedent in the way
already suggested, but he also might be pulled in the other direction.
Discriminatory disenfranchisement caused by local mistakes or
mismanagement might strike him, like Justice Stevens and others, as the kind
of arbitrary and unjustified conduct of government that cannot survive even
more lenient Equal Protection scrutiny.
Moreover, Justice Kennedy's willingness to sustain an Equal Protection
claim might well depend on the particular character of the local error and the
particular consequences it has with respect to the ability to cast a ballot that
counts. The misreading of a state statute that rejects a ballot for lack of
proper ID, when the voter supplied a perfectly acceptable form of ID, might
117 See, e.g., LULAC, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2641 (2006). See also Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 633 (1997) (embracing the "impartiality" perspective of Justice Stevens).
118 This kind of case would likely be evaluated under a form of intermediate
scrutiny. See, e.g., Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006); Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
119 For a discussion of different voting technologies, including Voter Verified Paper
Audit Trails (VVPATs), see Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting
and Democratic Values, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1711 (2005).
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seem to Justice Kennedy a more significant error, and one more directly
responsible for the disenfranchisement of that voter, than a local
misjudgment about the number of voting machines to send to a particular
precinct, which has the consequence of excessively long lines, but does not
categorically preclude any eligible voter from casting a ballot.
Additionally, Justice Kennedy's willingness to recognize a valid Equal
Protection claim in any of these mistake or mismanagement cases may
depend on whether it is the first to reach the Court on the merits after Bush v.
Gore itself. It might be too much of a leap for Justice Kennedy to sustain the
mistake-based claim without any additional intervening precedent. But if the
Court had already sustained an Equal Protection claim involving the unequal
verification of provisional ballots, and had done so unanimously based on the
authority of Bush v. Gore, the strength of that intermediate precedent might
make sustaining a particularly strong mistake-based claim not too big of a
step for Justice Kennedy.
Thus, like Hercules, Justice Kennedy can be influenced by path-
dependency and, ultimately, is just as difficult to predict.
E. When Will a Case Based on Bush v. Gore Get Before the Court?
There is no guarantee that the current composition of the Supreme Court
will confront the merits of an Equal Protection claim based on Bush v. Gore.
Indeed, it is quite unlikely this same group of nine will do so. Thus, one
cannot assume that Justice Kennedy will continue to be the moderate in the
middle, with four on his left and the other four on his right, when this kind of
claim is next addressed by the Court.
In fact, there are reasons to think it could take decades rather than years
for the Court to grant review in a case requiring it to resolve the merits of an
Equal Protection claim invoking the precedent of Bush v. Gore. There are
some potentially countervailing factors that might cause the Court to review
this kind of case, but I would bet against earlier rather than later review. And
if this prediction is correct, then all bets are off on how some unknown
composition of the Court several decades from now would decide the merits
of the case.
1. Near-term Prognosis for Another Bush v. Gore Claim
in the Supreme Court
As widely expected, the Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in
Wexler v. Anderson,120 the Eleventh Circuit case rejecting an Equal
Protection challenge to the lack of a paper record in Florida counties using
120 452 F.3d 1226 (11 th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 934 (2007).
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touchscreen voting machines. In addition to the general considerations that
counsel against Supreme Court review in any kind of case-most
prominently, the Court's desire to wait until a lower court conflict on the
precise issue is fully developed after "percolating" for a while 2 1 -one can
identify extra reasons why the Court would want to avoid a case requiring it
to apply the precedent of Bush v. Gore. That case was uniquely controversial
inside the Court, as well as among audiences that the Justices care most
about, 122 and the seven current Justices who participated in that case
presumably would resist opening old wounds unless there were a pressing
necessity to do so. Furthermore, the especially difficult nature of these Equal
Protection issues themselves, a difficulty observed in the Bush v. Gore
majority itself and echoed by Chief Justice Roberts during his confirmation
hearing, provides an added incentive to stay away from this sore subject.
Even if the Court wanted to revisit Bush v. Gore, it is unlikely that they
will have an opportunity to do so for a while. Stewart v. Blackwell, the Sixth
Circuit case involving punch-card voting machines, is now moot. 123 League
of Women Voters v. Blackwell,124 the important case involving an omnibus
challenge to Ohio's voting administration on grounds of widespread
inequities caused by massive mismanagement, is likely to settle soon, as
Ohio's newly elected Secretary of State and Attorney General have
announced. 125 The same is true of other lawsuits pending in Ohio, which
present potential Bush v. Gore-based claims concerning provisional balloting
and voter identification procedures.' 2 6 Prior to the 2008 election, there do not
appear to be any other prominent vehicles for taking a Bush v. Gore issue to
the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Court may soon decide an Equal Protection issue over voter
identification rules that does not involve the Bush v. Gore precedent. Several
important federal court cases are pending that challenge the constitutionality
of new voter identification state laws that impose more onerous requirements
121 See generally ROBERT L. STERN, EUGENE GRESSMAN, STEPHEN M. SHAPIRO &
KENNETH S. GELLER, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 247 (8th ed. 2002); Carolyn Shapiro,
The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging Versus Error Correction in the
Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271 (2006); Todd J. Tiberi, Comment, Supreme
Court Denials of Certiorari in Conflicts Cases: Percolation or Procrastination?, 54 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 861 (1993). See also Stefanie A. Lindquist & David E. Klein, The Influence
of Jurisprudential Considerations of Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict
Cases, 40 LAW& SOC'Y REV. 135 (2006).
122 See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE
ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006).
123 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007).
124 432 F. Supp. 2d 723 (N.D. Ohio 2005).
125 See Niquette & Nash, supra note 57.
126 Id.
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than had existed previously in those states. 127 A 2-1 decision of the Seventh
Circuit, with the majority opinion written by Judge Posner, rejects a
challenge of this kind to Indiana's version of this new voter ID legislation.' 28
This decision potentially could end up conflicting with contrary appellate
decisions in cases arising out of Arizona and other states. 129
The Supreme Court, even before the 2008 election, might step in to
resolve this conflict. But doing so would not require it to address Bush v.
Gore, as the Equal Protection issue in these voter ID cases is very different
from any of the variations on the Bush v. Gore theme that we have been
considering, including those variations involving voter ID laws. These other
ID cases do not allege any local variation in the administration of a state's ID
law. Rather, the Equal Protection claim is that the law disenfranchises
anyone who is unable to obtain the form of ID required by the statute. (These
other ID cases are attacks on the statutes as written, not on how they are
127 These cases are included in the Major Pending Case database on the Election
Law @ Moritz website. The opening page and chart for this database is
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/index.php. The Voter Identification cases
are collected together towards the bottom of the chart, which is organized alphabetically
by topic.
128 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007).
129 A conflict with the Arizona case is most likely because a Ninth Circuit panel has
already signaled its willingness to invalidate that state's ID law, by granting an
emergency injunction. Order, Gonzalez v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Nos. 06-16702,
06-16706 (9th Cir. October 5, 2006), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/
electionlaw/litigation/documents/06-16706 000.pdf, vacated sub nom. Purcell v.
Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5 (2006). In the Georgia voter ID case, although the federal district
court has also issued a preliminary injunction, a state trial court has permanently enjoined
that law's enforcement. Compare Common Cause/Georgia, League of Women Voters of
Georgia, Inc. v. Billups, 439 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (N.D. Ga. 2006) (most recent preliminary
injunction in federal case), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/
litigation/documents/georgia9-15-06ordergrantingpreliminaryinjunction.pdf, with Lake v.
Perdue, No. 2006CVI 19207 (Ga. Super. Ct. Fulton County filed July 7, 2006)
(permanent injunction in state case), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/
electionlaw/litigation/documents/Statelnjunction .pdf. Therefore, it is less likely that a
direct conflict will develop between the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, although it is still
conceivable if the Georgia Supreme Court reverses the state trial court's decision in an
appeal that is pending. See Brief of Appellant, Perdue v. Lake, No. S07A0525 (Ga. Jan.
8, 2007), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/ electionlaw/litigation/documents/Lake-
BriefofAppellantsSupremeCt.pdf. Likewise, there is federal-court litigation pending over
the municipal voter ID law in Albuquerque, New Mexico. ACLU of New Mexico v.
Chavez, No. Civ05-1136 (D. N.M. filed Oct. 27, 2005), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/aclunewmexico.php. That case on appeal
would go to the Tenth Circuit, creating another possible opportunity for a conflict with
the Seventh Circuit decision-as also would be true if the Kansas legislature enacts a new
voter ID law that has been recently proposed there. Tim Carpenter, Senator to Propose
Voter ID Bill, TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, Jan. 16, 2007, at 1A.
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enforced in particular counties or precincts, or whether their enforcement
changes over time as a result of varying interpretations or misunderstandings
of what the statutes require.) Often, the claim is framed that the newly
onerous ID requirement operates as a kind of poll tax because citizens must
pay for the underlying documents necessary to get the ID, even if they do not
need to pay for the ID itself.130
If the Supreme Court does take one of these ID cases, the Court's
decision will establish an important new Equal Protection precedent in the
area of voting administration. Moreover, given path-dependency and the
gravitational force that this important new Equal Protection precedent would
exert in nearby situations, this ID decision could end up affecting the Court's
consideration of any future claim based on Bush v. Gore itself (just as new
gerrymandering cases after LULAC conceivably could as well). But this new
ID decision would not itself involve an application of the Bush v. Gore
precedent, and thus would not provide a direct answer to any of the various
possible Bush v. Gore-based permutations that are open questions and
potential springboards to future lawsuits.
In the 2008 election itself, a new case may arise over local variation in
voting administration that directly raises an issue concerning the scope of the
Bush v. Gore precedent itself. That much seems likely enough, given the
litigation that occurred in 2004 and 2006. It is also possible that the case may
be important enough that it demands the Court's immediate attention during
the election process itself, just as Purcell v. Gonzalez did in 2006. Even so, it
is unlikely that the merits of the Equal Protection issue in the case would
require the Court's immediate resolution. Rather, it would be more likely that
the case would get to the Court in a posture where the Court's ruling
concerned a procedural issue, rather than the merits of the constitutional
claim itself, as occurred in Purcell (as well as in Spencer v. Pugh,131 the
2004 case involving polling place challenges). 132
It seemingly would take another recount affecting the presidential
election to cause the Court in 2008 to address the merits of an Equal
Protection claim based on Bush v. Gore, but the likelihood of a scenario
similar to Florida 2000 seems exceedingly low. After all, before 2000, the
country had lasted 124 years without need for Supreme Court intervention to
130 For further discussion of these ID cases, see Daniel P. Tokaji, Leave it to the
Lower Courts: On Judicial Intervention in Election Administration, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1065 (2007).
131 543 U.S. 1301 (2004).
132 For a discussion of these procedural rulings, see infra Part III.
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settle the winner of a presidential election. 133 Although Bush v. Gore
undoubtedly has encouraged lawyers on behalf of presidential candidates to
prepare potential lawsuits based on that precedent in the event of another
extraordinarily close race, 134 the fact that the outcome of the 2004
presidential election did not fall within the proverbial "margin of litigation"
demonstrates the unlikelihood that the 2008 presidential election will as well.
If indeed the country makes it past the 2008 election itself without the
Court needing to decide a Bush v. Gore issue, then presumably it will be a
different group of nine that will be the first to apply that case as precedent.
We can expect the next President to replace Justice Stevens (who would be
92 in 2012), and perhaps Justice Ginsburg as well (who, as the next oldest,
would be 79).135 Although neither replacement necessarily would move
Justice Kennedy from his metaphorically center seat, especially if a
Democrat wins the White House in 2008, it is possible that a Republican
winner in 2008 would make appointments that could cause the center of the
Court to shift rightward still, perhaps to Chief Justice Roberts himself.
2. Long-term Prognosis for Another Bush v. Gore Claim
Before the Supreme Court
One cannot know when a direct lower court conflict will develop over
the application of Bush v. Gore as an Equal Protection precedent. When
considering whether to grant certiorari, the Court distinguishes "true" from
"false" conflicts, as many petitions allege the existence of a conflict in lower
court holdings when, in reality, there is only "tension" in the language of
lower court opinions (what lawyers term "dicta"). 136 A true lower court
133 The literature on the Hays-Tilden election of 1876 is vast, especially after Bush
v. Gore, when comparisons were inevitable. Chief Justice Rehnquist himself wrote a
book on the subject: WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CENTENNIAL CRISIS: THE DISPUTED
ELECTION OF 1876 (2004). See also CHARLES FAIRMAN, FIVE JUSTICES AND THE
ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF 1877 (1988); RoY MORRIS, JR., FRAUD OF THE CENTURY:
RUTHERFORD B. HAYES, SAMUEL TILDEN, AND THE STOLEN ELECTION OF 1876 (2003).
134 See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation: Reforming US.
Election Administration to Avoid Electoral Meltdown, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 937
(2005). See also Ian Urbina, As Vote Nears, Parties Prepare for Legal Fights, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2006, at Al.
135 The birth dates of the Justices are on the U.S. Supreme Court's website:
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrent.pdf. Cf Hal Boedeker, PBS
Courts Viewers With Justice: A Documentary Examines and Celebrates the High Court
and its Towering Legal Minds, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 31, 2007, at E9 (both Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg in generally good health and desirous to stay on).
136 See also STERN ET AL., supra note 121, at 225; Thomas J. Long, Deciding
Whether Conflicts with Supreme Court Precedent Warrant Certiorari, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv
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conflict exists when, based on lower court precedent, it is clear that different
federal courts of appeals or state supreme courts would give opposite
answers to the same federal question presented in a case involving identical
facts. In other words, if the exact same case were in a different jurisdiction,
the highest court beneath the U.S. Supreme Court with the authority to
decide the case would undoubtedly reach the opposite result than the court
from which the petition for certiorari arrives. Of course, the Supreme Court
is sometimes willing to grant certiorari in the absence of a true lower court
conflict, but the odds are against it, and one can surmise the Court would be
looking for a true conflict before wading back into the territory of Bush v.
Gore. 137
Given the myriad of conceptually different fact patterns that might
present claims based on Bush v. Gore, as we saw from the four categories
identified above as well as multitudinous permutations within each distinct
category, it is unlikely that a true lower court conflict exists just because
some decisions sustain Bush v. Gore-based claims while others do not. For
example, suppose that the First Circuit rules meritorious a claim arising from
local variation in the verification of provisional ballots because of
insufficiently specific statewide standards (the strongest fact pattern in our
first category above), while the Second Circuit rejects a claim involving
excessively long lines at some precincts because of misallocation of voting
machines by county officials (by no means the strongest fact pattern within
the third category above). Although these results go in different directions,
there is no true conflict between them.
Here's how the apparent conflict could disappear. The First Circuit might
also reject the claim in the long lines case, while the Second Circuit might
also sustain the claim in the provisional ballot case. This is true even if the
Second Circuit's opinion in the long lines case contains dicta that is generally
dismissive of claims based on Bush v. Gore, saying that the court cannot
imagine circumstances beyond the facts of Bush v. Gore itself where such a
1104 (1984). See generally Arthur Hellman, Light on a Darkling Plain: Intercircuit
Conflicts in the Perspective of Time and Experience, 1998 SuP. CT. REV. 247 (1998).
137 Recently, there has been much discussion of the fact that the number of petitions
for certiorari that are worthy of a grant by historical standards ("certworthy" in local
parlance) is especially low, and that the Court therefore has had to relax its standards in
order to keep its docket of argued cases at the same level. Linda Greenhouse, As to the
Direction of the Roberts Court: The Jury is Still Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2007, at A15;
Linda Greenhouse, Case of the Dwindling Docket Mystifies the Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2006, at Al. If this phenomenon continues, it is conceivable that the Court
would feel compelled to take a case presenting an important Bush v. Gore claim even if a
"true conflict" did not exist on the precise question. Even so, a reluctance to consider
such a Bush v. Gore claim might cause the Court to apply its old "true conflict" standard
to this petition, even as it relaxed its standard for petitions presenting other kinds of
issues.
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claim would prevail. Until that court has before it the kind of provisional
ballot case where the First Circuit ruled in favor of the claim, one cannot
know for sure that the Second Circuit would reject it as well. The Second
Circuit might pull back on its dicta once it received briefing and argument on
the merits of the distinctively powerful claim in the provisional ballot
context. Conversely, even if the First Circuit's opinion in the provisional
ballot case sweeps broadly, suggesting that the court would sustain Equal
Protection claims "whenever there are unjustified local inequalities in voting
administration," one cannot be sure that the First Circuit would grant relief in
the long lines situation. That court, too, might pull back on its dicta,
observing that while long lines are an impediment to voting, they do not
involve an outright rejection of a ballot, whereas both Bush v. Gore and the
provisional voting case do, and the Equal Protection principle of those cases
should be understood as limited to that context rather than extending to the
long lines situation.
Thus, until either the First Circuit actually confronts a long-lines case of
its own, or the Second Circuit faces its own provisional ballot case, the
occasion for a true lower conflict has not yet arisen. Yet given the relative
infrequency of disputed elections--compare the ubiquity of criminal
prosecutions that could generate a true conflict over a Miranda-related
question138-it easily could take decades for a true conflict to emerge over
the application of Bush v. Gore. Moreover, if the Court would prefer for the
true conflict to widen (or percolate) among lower courts, rather than
resolving it as soon as just two courts reach opposite results on necessarily
equivalent facts, it could be another few decades before the Court decides it
is ready to tackle the issue.
To be sure, circumstances might arise that would cause the Court to
address the merits of a Bush v. Gore-based claim before a true conflict
developed. Another disputed presidential election, like Florida's in 2000,
could freakishly happen much sooner than it is reasonable to expect. And
perhaps the Supreme Court would feel obligated to resolve an Equal
Protection claim based on Bush v. Gore that arose in the context of a disputed
Senate or gubernatorial race, although the Court might feel that other
institutions could handle the particular dispute-the Senate in the case of one
of its own seats, and the applicable state legislature in the case of a
gubernatorial election. 139 Therefore, in the absence of a lower court conflict
138 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
139 Cf Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972). In this case, the Court held that the
Senate's constitutional authority to judge the qualifications of its own members did not
necessarily preclude a state court recount procedure. Id. at 25. But the Court in no way
suggested that it would supervise, or even let a lower federal court supervise, the
recounting of ballots in a Senate election. Id. at 20.
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over the Equal Protection question presented by the particular disputed
election, the Court might decide to let the other institution determine which
candidate won the contested race.
Instead, the Supreme Court would be more likely to intervene in the
absence of a true conflict if it perceived that the lower court decision
improperly prevented a state from making a constitutionally permissible
policy choice with respect to the structure of its voting process. For example,
if the Eleventh Circuit in Wexler v. Anderson had invoked Bush v. Gore to
prevent Florida from employing touchscreen machines unless equipped with
a paper trail, which would have been the opposite of the Eleventh Circuit's
actual decision in the case, the Supreme Court more likely would have
granted certiorari right away, despite the absence of any true conflict on the
issue. The reason is that this hypothetical result in Wexler would have
invalidated a policy choice made by the state's legislature, and the Court
feels obligated not to let federal constitutional law block a state legislature's
policy judgment on the basis of a lower court decision alone.140
Not all categories of Bush v. Gore claims involve challenges to state
policy choices. Claims based on insufficiently specific standards (category
one) or mistaken understanding of state law (category two), even if sustained
by a lower court, would not prevent a state legislature from making the
policy choices it wishes. Where local officials simply misread state law, a
lower court remedy for that inequality obviously would not intervene with
any policy choice made by the state legislature. In the case of insufficiently
specified standards, the state legislature could achieve its desired policy by
adopting more precise rules. Of course, if a lower court demanded more
precise results in a situation where they were not feasible, that would be
another matter, which might provoke immediate Supreme Court review.
Likewise, were a federal circuit to approve the kind of injunction sought in
League of Women Voters v. Blackwell-which essentially asks the federal
judiciary to take over supervisory control of a state's entire voting
administration system' 41-the Supreme Court would be more inclined to
140 See, e.g., STERN ET AL., supra note 121, at 247. See also Margaret Meriwether
Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential
Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 289 (2004).
141 Amended Complaint, supra note 37, at 58-60. In addition to itemizing eight
different areas of voting administration for which they want the federal court to order the
promulgation of specific uniform rules (including registration, voting machine
procurement and allocation, poll worker recruitment and training, and absentee and
provisional voting), the plaintiffs also ask the federal court to order the Secretary of State
to set up an administrative mechanism to detect and correct deficiencies that occur in the
operation of the electoral process. Finally, as a catch-all, the complaint asks for a federal
court injunction that requires the Secretary of State "[t]o ensure that each county within
Ohio conducts efficient, just and fair.. . elections." Id. at 60.
2007]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
intervene immediately, to prevent what on the merits might be an
unwarranted intrusion into a state's administrative prerogatives.
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to assume that the Supreme Court will
grant certiorari in the first case that comes to it where a lower court has
sustained an Equal Protection claim based on its view of Bush v. Gore as a
precedent. Even if the Justices themselves might be inclined to think that the
lower court had engaged in an unwarranted extension of Bush v. Gore-say,
for example, the Justices think that the precedent has no applicability to local
variation caused by mistakes rather than insufficiently specified standards in
the narrow circumstances of a court-ordered recount-the Justices still might
let the decision stand and wait for a true conflict to develop on the specific
issue. In this circumstance, there would be no harm to state sovereignty in
leaving the perhaps overly generous lower court decision in place. If nothing
else, the Justices might want to see how often cases arise in which
inequalities in voting opportunities result from local mistakes, as that piece
of data might eventually be a factor in its view of the merits of extending
Bush v. Gore to this category of mistake-based claims. Consequently, waiting
for a conflict to develop on this issue-and indeed letting this conflict
percolate for a while-might be beneficial to the Court's ultimate resolution
of the issue.
This analysis suggests, however, that a certain asymmetry might develop
in the Court's consideration of cases involving claims based on Bush v. Gore.
The first one that the Court will consider is most likely to be one in which the
lower court uses Bush v. Gore to invalidate a state legislature's policy choice
or, perhaps, the policy choice of the state's chief elections officer (usually
Secretary of State) under a delegation of authority granted by the state's
legislature. Moreover, a case of this kind is one further removed from the
facts of Bush v. Gore itself, in either the third or fourth category above
(depending on the nature of the state legislature's policy choice). Thus, it is a
case in which a majority of the Court is more likely to reject the merits of the
claim, thereby reversing the lower court's contrary decision. If so, then the
first Supreme Court case involving the application of Bush v. Gore as an
Equal Protection precedent will be to demarcate a limit on the scope of that
precedent.
Furthermore, this asymmetrical pattern might persist over time. While
the Court follows its general posture of waiting for true conflicts to percolate
in situations where state policy choices are not at stake, it immediately grants
review-and then reverses-in any case involving the invocation of Bush v.
Gore to invalidate a state policy choice. If this scenario develops in this way,
all Bush v. Gore claims in the third and fourth categories would be foreclosed
before the Court ever felt the need to resolve a true lower court claim over a
distinctive Equal Protection claim falling within either the first or second
categories: insufficiently specific standards or local misunderstandings of a
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state rule. The question then would be whether this path-dependent
development would cause the Court, when it eventually got around to
resolving a conflict over a claim in the first or second category, to reject that
claim based on the intervening negative precedent.
This path-dependent outcome is certainly possible for the reasons we
have discussed above: a category-two claim involving a local mistake ends
up getting to the Court in a much weaker posture, because the Court has
already foreclosed all category-three claims. But perhaps a true conflict will
develop over a category-one claim before it does over a category-two claim,
and the category-one claim will turn out to be strong enough to withstand the
negative pressure from the foreclosure of all category-three claims. Maybe,
then, by the time the category-two claim gets to the Court, there will be
enough positive counter-pressure from the vindication of the category-one
claim to cause it to prevail, even though it would have been rejected if they
had been decided in the opposite order.' 42
3. Reputational Concerns as a Review-Accelerating Factor?
Because Bush v. Gore itself was an extraordinary case, there may be
other extraordinary factors that could affect the Court's decision on whether
to grant certiorari in cases applying that precedent. We have already
identified a natural reluctance to open old wounds. But there is the potential
of a countervailing dynamic that deserves consideration.
Suppose a lower court rejects the merits of an especially strong category-
one Equal Protection claim, like the one involving variations in the
verification of provisional ballots. Suppose, further, that the lower court does
so in a way that disparages the Equal Protection holding of Bush v. Gore
itself, suggesting that it was unprincipled, applicable solely to its only chad-
based facts, and never to be relied upon to sustain the merits of any other
Equal Protection case. Judge Gilman essentially took that position in his
dissent in Stewart v. Blackwell, and that position might have become the
majority view in the Sixth Circuit after rehearing en banc, had the case not
142 In his own contribution to this symposium, Michael Solimine considers the
effect that the Court's discretionary control over its certiorari docket has with respect to
election law cases as a distinct category. See Michael E. Solimine, Institutional Process,
Agenda Setting, and the Development of Election Law on the Supreme Court, 68 OHIO
ST. L.J. 767 (2007). Solimine observes that the procedures that cause an election case to
be heard on the merits by the Court can affect the determination of the merits itself.
Consequently, these procedures warrant further study in their own right, a process that
Solimine has usefully begun. Because of the risk of strategic considerations affecting the
grant or denial of certiorari in voting administration cases, however, it may be that the
Court should have less, not more, discretionary control over its own docket in these
cases.
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disappeared on mootness grounds. 14 3 If a federal court of appeals were to
take this position in a strong category-one case, involving insufficiently
specific statewide standards, there might be a temptation on the part of some
Justices to take the case just to disprove the lower court's accusation that
Bush v. Gore was inherently unprincipled.
There is no doubt that the Justices consider the merits of the case when
they decide whether or not to grant certiorari, even though formally the
disposition of a certiorari petition is not a ruling on the merits, and even if
factors other than the merits of the case-like the presence or absence of a
true lower court conflict-heavily influence most decisions at the certiorari
stage. 144 Simply put, the Justices grant certiorari more often to reverse than
to affirm, as annual statistics routinely confirm. 145 Moreover, the Justices
always have in mind the possibility of a summary reversal: a merits ruling at
the certiorari stage, without benefit of further briefing and oral argument,
when a lower court decision is unquestionably wrong and deserving of
rectification, although not worthy of further deliberation by the Court. 146 A
lower court decision that disparaged Bush v. Gore itself, refusing to apply it
to facts where its precedent was most forceful (like the provisional ballot
case), might not warrant a summary reversal in the eyes of the Justices, but it
might be reason enough to grant certiorari in the case, to set the record
straight that Bush v. Gore has some scope beyond solely its own facts. If
discussion of this disparaging lower court opinion at the Court's conference
on the petition for certiorari indicated quickly that there was widespread
143 Judge Gilman relied extensively on Richard L. Hasen's 2001 article, Bush v.
Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in Elections, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377
(2001), which argued that it is difficult to take the case seriously as an Equal Protection
precedent. Discussing Hasen's article for several pages, see Stewart v. Blackwell, 444
F.3d 843, 886-89 (6th Cir. 2006) (Gilman, J., dissenting), and characterizing its analysis
as "reasons ably articulated by a leading election-law expert," Judge Gilman concluded
that the Sixth Circuit "should heed the Supreme Court's own warning and limit the reach
of Bush v. Gore to the peculiar and extraordinary facts of that case." Id. at 886. When in
response the majority opinion accused Judge Gilman of allowing a law review article to
overrule a Supreme Court precedent, Judge Gilman replied: "I am not... making
[that] ... nonsensical claim ... [but] instead faithfully following the Supreme Court's
explicit admonition .... " Id. at 889.
144 STERN ET AL., supra note 121, at 256; Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the
Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727 (2001).
145 See STERN ET AL., supra note 121, at 257; LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME
COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 712-14 (4th ed. 2007). See
also Saul Brenner & John F. Krol, Strategies in Certiorari Voting on the United States
Supreme Court, 51 J. POL. 4 (1989); Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, The Federal
Court System: A Principle-Agent Perspective, 47 ST. Louis U. L.J. 819, 826 (2003).
146 STERN ET AL., supra note 121, at 315-16. See also Marcia Coyle, 'Hamdan' and
the Rest, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 2006, at 1 (noting an increase in summary reversals).
[Vol. 68:925
FUTURE OF BUSH V. GORE
sentiment among the Justices that this case was an easy one-the principle of
Bush v. Gore readily applies, for example, to local variations in the rejection
of provisional ballots caused by an insufficiently specific state law that easily
could have been clearer-then the Justices would know that granting the
petition, far from opening old wounds, would actually help bury any
lingering ill feelings over Bush v. Gore itself. An easy ruling extending Bush
v. Gore to a new set of facts, in addition to showing this lower court that it
was wrong to disparage that Equal Protection precedent, would have the
added benefit of showing academics and all the other commentators that
castigated Bush v. Gore that its Equal Protection holding was indeed
principled.
An important new book on judicial behavior, by Ohio State political
scientist Larry Baum, posits that judges are concerned about their reputations
among audiences whom they care about. 147 Supreme Court Justices, in
particular, are concerned about their reputation among other intellectual
elites in society, including leading academics and journalists. One can
surmise that several Justices are concerned with reputational damage caused
to the Court among intellectual elites by Bush v. Gore and would be pleased
to find a vehicle for rehabilitating that reputation.
Justice Kennedy, in particular, would appear to have the most direct
incentive of this kind. Assuming he indeed is the author of the majority
opinion in Bush v. Gore, he might welcome an easy opportunity to put that
precedent on a firmer footing. Some Court observers have suggested that he
is particularly concerned about his reputation among intellectual elites. 148 If
so, he would be especially troubled by a lower court opinion that essentially
thumbed its nose at Bush v. Gore, echoing academic and media commentary
that mocked its Equal Protection ruling as openly unprincipled.
Although Justices Scalia and Thomas joined the majority opinion in Bush
v. Gore, their general jurisprudence would give them little reason to reach
out for a case that would bolster the Equal Protection principle of Bush v.
Gore. Although they might not argue vociferously against a grant of
certiorari in a case like this, it is doubtful that they would take the lead in
bringing it to the Court. Justices Breyer and Souter, on the other hand,
expressed sympathy with the Equal Protection holding of Bush v. Gore,
although not its remedy, and they are Justices who appear especially
concerned about the Court's institutional reputation among intellectual
elites. 149 Thus, they might well be inclined to join Justice Kennedy in
147 BAUM, supra note 122.
148 Id. at 143.
149 Jeffrey L. Yates & Andrew B. Whitford, The Presidency and the Supreme Court
After Bush v. Gore: Implications for Institutional Legitimacy and Effectiveness, 13 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REv. 101, 106 (2002) ("Of all of the dissenters in Bush v. Gore, Justice
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granting certiorari to reverse a lower court opinion that they perceive as
challenging the Court's institutional integrity if left unreviewed.
For similar reasons, Chief Justice Roberts might go along with a grant in
an easy case for extending Bush v. Gore, where the lower court opinion
showed disrespect for the Supreme Court's Equal Protection ruling there. In
his confirmation hearings, he seemed eager, or at least willing, to
acknowledge that the precedent of Bush v. Gore could be applied in a
principled way. Moreover, as Chief Justice, he has special concern for the
overall reputation of the federal judiciary, and a lower court opinion
disrespectful of Bush v. Gore, even if rendering a correct resolution of the
Equal Protection claim on its particular facts, would be worthy of a rebuke
from the High Court. Especially if Justices Stevens and Ginsburg (or their
replacements down the road) seem willing to go along with an emerging
consensus at the Court's conference that this petition should be granted to
show that the Equal Protection principle of Bush v. Gore extends beyond its
own unique facts, then one can imagine how certiorari might be granted in
this kind of situation even without the existence of a lower court conflict.
But even if the Justices would still wait for a lower court conflict to
develop, this reputational concern might cause them to grant certiorari in a
case as soon as the conflict arose among two lower courts, rather than
waiting for it to widen or percolate (as they otherwise might be inclined to
do). Suppose that one lower court says that Bush v. Gore is essentially
meaningless as a precedent, even in a category-one case presenting especially
compelling facts for extending it slightly, whereas another lower court says
just the opposite on equivalent facts. That two-court true conflict, with one
side taunting the Court, might provoke an immediate grant.
Even if no lower court adopts a position as provocatively dismissive as
Judge Gilman's dissent in Stewart v. Blackwell, the Justices' concern for the
Court's reputation among intellectual elites still might accelerate their
granting review in a Bush v. Gore-based case. The reason is that there is a
certain irony about the nature of the Equal Protection principle in Bush v.
Gore, especially if it is best understood as focused on circumstances
involving insufficiently specific standards. Bush v. Gore is itself
insufficiently specific in the Equal Protection standard it adopts, and any
conflict among lower courts concerning the implementation of the Equal
Protection principle in Bush v. Gore could be seen as contrary to the
Breyer seemed most concerned with the impact of the case on the Court's legitimacy and
efficacy."). See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (discussing
Court's reputation as a factor in stare decisis; Justice Souter commonly recognized as
author of stare decisis portion of Casey).
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principle itself.150 Divergence among lower courts interpreting Bush v. Gore
would be a species of local variation in the interpretation of a vague, general
standard concerning the counting of ballots, and commentators could poke
fun at the doctrine of Bush v. Gore as being in violation of itself. (Bush v.
Gore ruled unconstitutional the "unequal evaluation of ballots" for "want of'
"specific rules designed to assure uniform treatment," yet when provisional
ballots get counted in one federal circuit, whereas they do not in another
federal circuit, because of a circuit split over Bush v. Gore itself, this circuit
split presents its own Bush v. Gore problem.) While this irony is "inside
baseball," to which the general public would remain oblivious, it would be a
source of ongoing embarrassment within the elite Court-watching circles
(academics and journalists) whose opinions the Justices care about.
Consequently, at least four Justices might wish to grant certiorari sooner
rather than later, to clear up lower court confusion about the proper scope of
the Equal Protection principle in Bush v. Gore.
For this reason, again, these Justices might jump at the chance to resolve
the first true conflict arising over the application of Bush v. Gore. Moreover,
they might not even wait for a true conflict to develop if they see sufficient
confusion among lower court opinions on the proper understanding of that
precedent. Considerable disagreement among lower court judges concerning
Bush v. Gore suggests unpredictability, even lawlessness, in an area of law
(voting administration) that the Court-indeed, Bush v. Gore specifically-
says requires predictability and evenhanded clarity. A desire that intellectual
elites come to view the doctrine of Bush v. Gore as consistent with the values
underlying Bush v. Gore might motivate the Justices to grant review of a new
Bush v. Gore case sooner than they otherwise would be inclined to do so.
One should not, however, make too much of this reputational concern. It
is only one factor among many likely to influence the views of each Justice
as they decide whether or not to grant certiorari in a particular case.
Moreover, the strength of this reputational concern is dependent upon the
particular details of the case in which the petition is filed (did the lower court
thumb its nose at the Court?), as well as the circumstances regarding the
overall lower-court landscape in Bush v. Gore territory. As long as most
lower-court decisions applying Bush v. Gore appear to the Justices as
reasonable (even if not necessarily correct) efforts to make sense of that
precedent, and if apparent divergences among those lower court decisions are
best explained by the different particular facts of each case (such that true
conflicts, if any, are few and not widespread), then the Justices quite likely
would just as soon stay away from these cases. If this scenario is the one that
150 Cf Mary A. Case, Are Plain Hamburgers Now Unconstitutional? The Equal
Protection Component of Bush v. Gore as a Chapter in The History of Ideas About Law,
70 U. CHI. L. REv. 55 (2003).
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unfolds, as is probably the best bet, then indeed it could be decades before
the Court is ready to revisit that precedent.
In other words, the future of Bush v. Gore as an Equal Protection
precedent could be somewhat analogous to the status of Bakke151 during the
two-and-a-half decades before Grutter 152and Gratz.153 In each situation, the
rather inscrutable pronouncement from on high takes on a life of its own in
the lower court and in the community regulated by the precedent. UC Davis
Medical School may have lost, but higher education administrators were able
to work with Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke to fashion an affirmative
action regime suitable to their purposes, with limited interference from lower
courts. Once the issue had matured enough to require the Supreme Court to
intervene in the area again, the accumulated history of relevant events on the
ground were critical in shaping Justice O'Connor's consideration of the new
cases.
Something similar could occur in the world of voting administration
concerning the Equal Protection principle in Bush v. Gore. Voting rights
activists and election officials could build up their own operational
expectations of what Equal Protection requires regarding the casting and
counting of ballots. These expectations, left relatively undisturbed or even
largely validated by lower courts that intermittently confront deviations from
prevailing practices, could accumulate into a body of wisdom about what
Bush v. Gore stands for, in much the same way that there had developed a
"settled understanding" of Bakke despite its having been the pronouncement
of a single Justice. At whatever point a situation arises that requires the Court
to revisit Bush v. Gore, that accumulated understanding of the case among
election practitioners might end up being as significant, or even more so,
than any "original understanding" of the precedent that the Justices might
have had.
Thus, the future of Bush v. Gore as an Equal Protection precedent is
extraordinarily unpredictable. It depends on what particular fact patterns
arrive at the Court and when they do so, including in what order. It depends
on what the lower courts have done with those fact patterns and who sits on
the Court when they arrive there. And it depends on the psychological
disposition of the Justices to either stay away from a sore subject or return to
it in an effort to set matters straight. Yet the psychological disposition of the
Justices themselves in this regard is likely to be affected by all these other
unpredictable factors.
Law in general may lack certainty, but the law of Bush v. Gore seems
especially open to alternative pathways.
151 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
152 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
153 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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III. THE PROCEDURAL PRECEDENT OF BUSH V. GORE
It is sometimes suggested that the significance of Bush v. Gore lies less
in its doctrinal Equal Protection holding, whatever that may be, and more in
its signal that the federal judiciary stands ready to remedy irregularities that
occur in the administration of state voting procedures. As Samuel Issacharoff
has succinctly put it, the message of Bush v. Gore is that the courts are "open
for business" in these sorts of cases. 154 Moreover, the election law
community has certainly received this message: as Richard Hasen has
documented, the number of lawsuits over voting procedures has risen sharply
since Bush v. Gore.155
In addition, some of these lawsuits have been successful in shaping the
legal terrain on which electoral battles between candidates are fought. Most
noticeably, litigation in 2004 prevented the Republican Party in Ohio from
challenging the eligibility of 35,000 new voters in pre-election administrative
proceedings. 156 Similarly, litigation in 2006 prevented newly enacted voter
identification laws from taking effect, at least in part, in Ohio as well as other
states (Georgia and Missouri). 157
But the record of litigation since Bush v. Gore over voting administration
procedures is decidedly mixed. More lawsuits appear to have been futile
rather than successful, especially when considering the number of district
court injunctions vacated on appeal. Indeed, the only opinion of the Supreme
Court in a voting administration case since Bush v. Gore sends a strong
signal against federal court intervention. Furthermore, upon reflection, Bush
v. Gore is a case more about shutting courthouse doors than opening them:
154 He made this point during the presentation of an earlier draft of this paper at this
Symposium. Samuel Issacharoff, Remarks at the Election Law and the Roberts Court
Symposium at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law (Sept. 29, 2006)
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/lawjoumal/symposium/2006-07/index.php (follow
the "Friday Afternoon" hyperlink, remarks start at 19:40).
155 Hasen, Beyond the Margin of Litigation, supra note 134, at 958.
156 Miller v. Blackwell, 348 F. Supp. 2d 916 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (granting TRO), stay
denied, 388 F.3d 546 (6th Cir. 2004).
157 In the Ohio ID case in 2006, although the Sixth Circuit vacated the district
court's TRO, a subsequent consent decree blocking any enforcement of the ID rules with
respect to absentee ballots gave the plaintiffs the same relief they had specifically sought
in the TRO. Consent Order, NEOCH v. Blackwell, No. C2-06-896 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 1,
2006), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/NEOCH
ConsentOrd.pdf. In Georgia, a state trial court permanently enjoined enforcement of that
state's new ID law, preventing it from having effect before the 2006 general election. See
supra note 129. In Missouri, that state's supreme court invalidated the ID law there as
contrary to the state's constitution. Weinshenk v. Missouri, 203 S.W.3d 201 (Mo. 2006),
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Opinion.pdf.
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the Court there, after all, precluded any further recount proceedings that the
Florida Supreme Court might have wished to have ordered.
Thus, the ultimate procedural legacy of Bush v. Gore, far from expanding
judicial supervision over state administrative procedures for the casting and
counting of ballots, may narrowly circumscribe judicial involvement in these
matters, limiting the availability of judicial relief to only especially egregious
situations.
A. Litigation over Voting Administration Procedures
since Bush v. Gore
Apart from the successes already mentioned, it is important to identify
those situations since Bush v. Gore where litigation over procedures for
casting and counting ballots failed to change either the outcome of the
election or the rules according to which the electoral battle was fought.
First, and foremost, in the contested 2004 gubernatorial election in
Washington, where the final certification showed the Democratic candidate
with only 129 more votes than her Republican opponent, the court refused a
remedy despite accepting the fact that this certified result included 1678
unlawful votes. 158 This situation is arguably the one since 2000 most like the
contested presidential election in Florida: it involved a ballot-by-ballot brawl
over which candidate won an important statewide race. It was also a situation
where there was good reason to think that the wrong candidate had been
certified the winner: although no one would ever know for sure for which
candidate those 1678 unlawful votes had been cast, they disproportionately
came from precincts that favored the Democratic candidate-and by margins
great enough to indicate that the outcome would have been the opposite if
these unlawful votes had been properly excluded.
Moreover, if there was to be any remedy for this apparently erroneous
outcome, it would have to come from the courts, as the state's legislature was
politically predisposed to favor the Democratic candidate. But no such
remedy was forthcoming. Instead, the trial judge slammed shut the
courthouse door, because it was impossible to prove for whom the unlawful
votes had been cast. The Republican candidate decided not to appeal, in part
because precedent from the state supreme court supported the trial court's
ruling. Nor did the Republican candidate attempt to have the federal judiciary
prevent or undo the certification of the election because, although the
certification was undeniably flawed, the federal courts would not have
perceived themselves empowered to declare a different winner or order a
new election.
158 Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Wash. Super. Ct. June 6, 2005),
available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/oraldecision.pdf.
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This outcome in Washington, then, shows that, after Bush v. Gore,
judicial relief remains unavailable even where it is arguably most needed to
rectify administrative irregularities regarding the counting of ballots in
important statewide elections.159
Second, also in 2004, although in Ohio there was the litigation that
prevented pre-election challenges of voter eligibility, other litigation in that
state was much less successful. A state court suit to add to the voter
registration rolls over 10,000 names that allegedly had been improperly
omitted was rejected on the ground that these individuals could cast
provisional ballots and the validity of their omission from the rolls could be
resolved during the process of verifying their provisional ballots. 160 (A
similar suit in Florida in 2004 was also rejected on similar grounds. 161) A
federal court suit to overturn Ohio's rule that provisional ballots must be cast
in the proper precinct to be counted, although successful in the district court,
was largely overturned in the Sixth Circuit.' 62 Likewise, after the victory
over pre-election challenges, another suit to block challenges to voter
eligibility at polling places on Election Day, although also successful in the
district court, was overturned by the Sixth Circuit, 163 and on Election Day
itself Justice Stevens issued a pre-dawn opinion as Circuit Justice refusing to
intervene.1 64
Third, turning to 2006, again in Ohio, although one suit attacking a
patently unconstitutional aspect of the state's new voter identification law
(which required naturalized citizens, but not native-born citizens, to provide
documentation of their citizenship) resulted in an injunction that was not
appealed by the state, 165 and although another suit seeking to block
enforcement of the voter ID law altogether ended in a consent decree that
159 For further discussion of whether judicial relief should be available in
circumstances like the 2004 Washington gubernatorial election, see Huefner, supra note
83.
160 Citizens Alliance for Secure Elections v. Vu, No. 1:04cv2147 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
27, 2004) (order denying temporary restraining order), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/docs/ohio/citizens/order.pdf. See also Lucas County
Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 341 F. Supp. 2d 861, 864 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (denying
similar order).
161 Diaz v. Hood, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1113 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
162 Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565 (6th Cir. 2004).
163 Summit County Democratic Central and Executive Comm. v. Blackwell, 388
F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2004).
164 Spencer v. Pugh, 543 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2004) (Stevens, Circuit Justice).
165 Boustani v. Blackwell, 460 F. Supp. 2d 822, 823 (N.D. Ohio 2006) (order
granting permanent injunction), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/
litigation/documents/OpinionandOrder.pdf. (My Moritz colleague Dan Tokaji served as
counsel for the plaintiffs in this case.)
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prohibited its applicability to absentee ballots, 166 a district court decision that
would have served as a predicate for enjoining its enforcement entirely was
vacated by the Sixth Circuit. 167 Similarly, on Election Day in Ohio, another
federal district judge ordered polling places in Cleveland to stay open until
9:00 P.M., because there had been delays in their opening in the morning, but
later that day the Sixth Circuit modified that decision-as required by the
Help America Vote Act-by ordering that any ballots cast during those
extended hours be provisional ballots. 168 In Texas, a federal district judge
enjoined enforcement of a state law that prohibited third parties from
handling absentee ballots without disclosure, and the Fifth Circuit quickly
vacated that decision.169
The pattern of these cases suggests an excessive exuberance on the part
of some federal judges to intervene in the administration of a state's voting
procedures. Perhaps that exuberance is motivated in part by a feeling that the
spirit of Bush v. Gore authorizes such intervention. But in each of these
cases, the appellate courts consider the interference unjustified, with the
166 See Miller v. Blackwell, 348 F. Supp. 2d 916 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
167 NEOCH v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1002 (6th Cir. 2006). This Sixth Circuit
ruling was particularly damaging to the plaintiffs in the case because it took a restrictive
view both on standing and on the balancing of the equities relevant for the issuance of
any preliminary injunction. Id. at 1010-12. The appellate court saw little harm to
plaintiffs from requiring voters to present ID, since the only consequence was having to
cast a provisional ballot (which could be counted without regard to lack of ID if, after
Election Day, the state's ID law were ruled invalid on federal grounds). Id. at 1011-12.
By contrast, the appellate court saw great harm to the state from a preliminary injunction
that prevented election officials from requiring voters to present ID, since if after Election
Day the state's ID law were ruled valid on federal grounds, there would be no way to
undo the consequences of ballots having been cast without an ID requirement in effect.
Id. at l011.
168 Ohio Democratic Party v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Elections, No. 06-4452 (6th
Cir. Nov. 7, 2006) (order modifying district court order), available at http://
moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/6thcircuitdecision.pdf. Although the
Sixth Circuit observed that it had no time to pass judgment on the merits of the extension
itself, the only justification that the district court gave for its intervention was a single-
sentence assertion that the delayed opening of the polls, resulting in "wait times in excess
of one hour," was arguably a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Ohio
Democratic Party v. Cuyahoga County Bd. Of Elections, No. 1:06CV2692 (N.D. Ohio
Nov. 7, 2006) (order granting preliminary injunctions in part at 1), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ccorder.pdf. After Purcell v.
Gonzalez, see infra Part II.B, it seems highly unlikely that this meager assertion provides
a sufficient factual basis or reasoned explanation for federal court interference in the
voting process.
169 Ray v. Abbot, No. 06-41573, 1 (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2006) (order granting motion to
stay) (per curiam), application to vacate denied, 127 S. Ct. 551 (2006) (mem.), available
at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/USCAJUDGMENT.pdf.
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upshot being more and more law defining when federal courts should keep
their hands off the workings of a state's voting process.
B. The Importance of Purcell v. Gonzalez
The excessive exuberance of one federal court in 2006 ended up in a
unanimous Supreme Court opinion rebuking that court. 170 In this case, the
court was the Ninth Circuit rather than a district court, but the Supreme Court
played the role of an appellate court vacating an injunction that the Ninth
Circuit had issued. The case involved another new voter ID law, this one
from Arizona. The plaintiffs had challenged it as an unconstitutional poll tax
in the same way that other new ID laws had been challenged elsewhere. The
district court refused to grant a preliminary injunction to block enforcement
of the law in the November election, but a two-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit agreed to do so. The unanimous Supreme Court opinion vacating that
injunction has been widely viewed as a signal to all federal courts to proceed
very cautiously before interfering with the operation of a state's voting
procedures during the last few weeks immediately preceding Election
Day. 17 1
170 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 6-8 (2006) (per curiam). Justice Stevens wrote
a brief concurrence with a softer tone, but he joined the per curiam opinion as well.
Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 8 (Stevens, J., concurring).
171 Rick Hasen and Dan Tokaji fear that lower federal courts will indeed view
Purcell this way. See Richard L. Hasen, The Untimely Death of Bush v. Gore, 60 STAN.
L. REv. 101 (2007); Tokaji, supra note 130, at 1088-90. I am less troubled by Purcell
than they are. For reasons that Professor Tokaji identifies in his immensely valuable
contribution to this Symposium, the unanimous opinion in Purcell is not a ruling on the
merits of Arizona's voter identification requirement-and its brief discussion of the issue
merely provides background for the opinion's purely procedural ruling. Id. More
importantly, regarding that procedural ruling, I consider it more appropriate than Hasen
or Tokaji do for the Supreme Court to send a cautionary signal about the potentially
disruptive effects of judicial intervention shortly before the polls open for voting.
Professor Hasen reads Purcell too broadly when he suggests that it prevents lower courts
from issuing pre-election orders to protect voters from disenfranchisement. See Hasen,
supra, at 134. On the contrary, the availability of provisional ballots guarantees that no
voter need be disenfranchised by a voter identification requirement that a federal court
after Election Day rules unconstitutional. (At the time of its post-election ruling, the
federal court can order the provisional ballots to be counted if the state's reason for not
counting them is the unconstitutional voter ID law.) While I agree with both Hasen and
Tokaji that pre-election litigation is generally preferable to post-election disputes over
provisional ballots, that general preference must be weighed against the destabilizing
nature of last-minute lawsuits before voting begins. All Purcell holds is that, in the
particular posture of the case before it, the balance of equities favors lifting the Ninth
Circuit's belated order (in part because of the availability of provisional voting, as the
Court itself expressly observes). Additionally, I think Professor Tokaji is uncharitable in
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In fact, the Supreme Court opinion is explicit and emphatic on this point.
The opinion begins a key paragraph with the observation that, because the
case arrived at the Ninth Circuit "just weeks before an election," that court
"was required to weigh, in addition to the harms attendant upon issuance or
nonissuance of an injunction, considerations specific to election
cases .. , "172 Then, in a crucial sentence, the opinion states, "Court orders
affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can themselves result in
voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from the polls."'
173
The clear implication is that courts must not issue such orders when the risk
of these disruptive effects outweighs whatever other net benefits judicial
intervention would provide. And to make this point even clearer, the Court
adds, "As an election draws closer, that risk will increase."
174
To be sure, the Supreme Court's opinion in Purcell v. Gonzales does not
rule out altogether judicial intervention in the immediate run-up to an
election. The circumstances of a particular case might provide sufficiently
egregious grounds to warrant such disruption. But the Supreme Court makes
plain that the issuance of any such injunction must be accompanied by
cogent factual findings and compelling reasons to justify the intrusion into
the state's voting process. Because the Ninth Circuit gave no such findings or
reasoning, the Court felt compelled to vacate that court's injunction. The
Court explicitly recognizes the consequence of its decision: "Given the
imminence of the election and the inadequate time to resolve the factual
disputes, our action today shall of necessity allow the election to proceed
without an injunction suspending the voter identification rules."'175 That
consequence, however, is simply the result of the Court's basic presumption
against judicial intervention during the last few weeks before an election, a
presumption that the Ninth Circuit never endeavored to overcome.
The Purcell opinion quickly sent ripples throughout the judiciary. The
Sixth Circuit relied on it when vacating the district court order that
threatened to block any enforcement of Ohio's voter ID law. 176 Likewise, the
Fifth Circuit invoked it when vacating the district court's injunction that
asserting that Purcell "demonstrates little regard or interest in the practical realities of
election administration." Tokaji, supra, at 30-31. I believe, instead, that the Court's
concern about the practical difficulties caused by election-eve injunctions was a primary
motive for its warning against the issuance of unduly disruptive decrees.
172 Purcell, 127 S. Ct. at 7.
173 Id.
174 Id.
1 7 5 Id. at 8.
176 NEOCH v. Blackwell, 467 F.3d 999, 1012 (6th Cir. 2006).
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blocked enforcement of the Texas absentee ballot regulation. 177 In that Texas
case, the plaintiffs asked the Supreme Court to overturn the Fifth Circuit
decision on the ground that Purcell stood for the proposition that federal
appellate courts should not disrupt decisions reached by federal district
courts, absent especially compelling justifications, when the case involves
voting procedures and the time is close to Election Day. 178 But that argument
fell on deaf ears at the Supreme Court. 179 The true lesson of Purcell is an
asymmetrical one: federal appellate decisions that grant injunctions denied
by district courts will get close scrutiny from the Supreme Court itself, while
federal appellate decisions vacating injunctions granted by district courts will
receive much more deferential review by the Supreme Court. The reason for
this asymmetry, again, is a presumption-we can call it the Purcell
presumption-against judicial intervention into voting procedures when the
time is close to the election itself.' 80
C. The Procedural Implications of Bush v. Gore-Revisited
When seen in the light of the Purcell presumption, the decision in Bush
v. Gore appears very different than in its immediate aftermath. No longer is
its most salient feature the fact that the Court intervened in the Florida
recount dispute, but rather that the Court ordered the Florida Supreme Court
to remove itself from that controversy, just as in Purcell the Court ordered
the Ninth Circuit to withdraw its interference in that case. The two cases
stand together, not as authorizations of judicial intervention in the operations
of a state's procedures for casting and counting ballots, but rather as explicit
repudiations of two specific instances of such judicial interventions, coupled
with more general warnings about comparable interventions in future cases.
177 Ray v. Abbot, No. 06-41573, 2 (5th Cir. Nov. 3, 2006) (order granting motion to
stay), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Ray-
ORDERofUSCAastoNoticeofAppeal.pdf.
178 Emergency Application to Vacate Stay, Ray v. Abbot, 127 S. Ct. 551 (Nov. 4,
2006), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/
RayEmergencyApplication.pdf.
179 Ray v. Abbot, 127 S. Ct. 551 (2006) (order denying emergency application to
vacate stay), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/
RayOrderDenyingStay.pdf. Justice Souter would have granted the application, but none
of the other Justices so indicated.
180 My reading of Purcell differs from Professor Tokaji's in this regard. He
evidently does not embrace the asymmetrical presumption insofar as he asserts that the
lesson of Purcell is for federal courts of appeals to defer to district court decisions
regarding the issuance of pre-election injunctions. Rather than believing that the Fifth and
Sixth Circuits misread Purcell in acting consistently with this asymmetrical presumption,
I think these courts of appeals understood the Supreme Court's message correctly.
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When put together with Purcell, Bush v. Gore need not be seen as a red
light against all forms of judicial intervention into voting process, whether
before ballots are cast or after they are counted. But neither can Bush v. Gore
be seen as a green light to such lawsuits, even if it appears that many have
attempted to view it this way. Rather, both Bush v. Gore and the new Purcell
decision are properly viewed as cautionary yellow lights, signaling to lower
courts to be especially careful before interfering with a state's voting
procedures, whether before or after the ballots are cast. 181
Once lower courts pay appropriate heed to this yellow light from the
Supreme Court, the level of litigation over voting procedures may scale back
down towards levels prior to Bush v. Gore. While there will continue to be
some meritorious suits, including some premised on the Equal Protection
principle of Bush v. Gore itself, their relatively low rate of success over time
may dampen the enthusiasm for bringing such suits. Litigation no longer will
be a campaign strategy to quite the same extent as it has been in these first
few years after Bush v. Gore. 182
181 This interpretation of Bush v. Gore is supported by a comment that Justice
Kennedy made for the record to Jan Crawford Greenburg in an interview for her new
book:
It would be odd if the people who brought the litigation would later say that the
courts shouldn't intervene.... We didn't say that the case should go to the court.
Those were the other parties that made that decision for us. And for us to say, 'Oh,
we're not going to get involved because we're too important,' well, you know, that's
wrong.
GREENBURG, supra note 100, at 32. As I understand Justice Kennedy's point here, it
is that, once the recount is proceeding pursuant to the order of the Florida Supreme Court,
then the U.S. Supreme Court has an obligation-given its supervisory authority over
federal constitutional questions raised by how the recount is proceeding according to that
state court order-to pronounce whether that recount is proceeding in an unconstitutional
way. Right or wrong in terms of the Court's exercise of its discretionary certiorari
jurisdiction (especially when subsequent congressional procedures were available),
Justice Kennedy's perspective is not an invitation to further litigation, either in federal or
state court, over the way states administer the casting and counting of ballots. To the
extent that candidates and others view Bush v. Gore as an invitation to this kind of
litigation, they are likely to be disappointed more often than not.
182 It bears emphasis that this conclusion regarding the procedural dimension of
Bush v. Gore is distinct from the analysis, in Part II, of the substantive scope of the case's
Equal Protection holding. The procedural point concerns the remedial authority of courts,
particularly the timing of remedies in relationship to the voting process itself. Much of
the procedural caution concerns the issuance of preliminary injunctions and temporary
restraining orders as voting is underway or about to begin, or involves the authority of
courts to void election results in contrast to ordering carefully tailored injunctive relief
well in advance of the next cycle of voting. Thus, understanding Bush v. Gore as
narrowing the procedural scope of judicial interference with a state's conduct of its
voting processes does not necessarily entail (although it would be consistent with) a
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IV. THE INSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF BUSH V. GORE
Over time, Bush v. Gore will contribute to the development of voting
administration law. Its Equal Protection holding will have an as-yet-uncertain
scope, but it is likely to govern at least a core category of cases involving
insufficiently specified ballot-counting rules. As a procedural precedent, it
sends a mixed signal about court supervision of voting procedures that
eventually will cause campaigns and their attorneys to be careful and
selective about relying on litigation to alter the electoral playing field.
But the future of Bush v. Gore concerns not just voting administration
law specifically, but the role of the Supreme Court in American government
more generally. Because the case will be forever known as the one in which
the Court picked the President (even if Bush eventually would have prevailed
had the dispute gone all the way to Congress), the case will continue to have
implications for how both the Justices themselves and other opinion leaders
in society view the job the Justices are doing. As an election specialist, I shall
largely leave this wider inquiry to others, but some observations here may be
worthwhile.
David Cole has recently written that Bush v. Gore has already had a
perhaps unpredictable yet discernible influence of causing the Court,
specifically Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, to be more liberal than
otherwise would have been the case. 183 Pointing to prominent decisions like
Grutter and Hamdi,184 as well as a statistical analysis of 5-4 decisions in the
four years immediately before and after Bush v. Gore, Cole argues that the
vehement criticism of that case produced a kind of internal backlash in the
minds of these two Justices and, whether consciously or not, they strove to
render opinions that would show them to be fair-minded to their critics. 185
(Cole's thesis can be viewed as a specific instance of more general
reputational concern discussed by Baum: the desire of the Justices to be well-
respected by intellectual elites, particularly in the media and academia.)
Whether true or not, it is interesting to consider the extent to which this
phenomenon can be observed in election cases concerning topics other than
administrative procedures for casting and counting ballots.186
narrow scope of the Equal Protection principle with respect to the four categories of cases
developed in Part II.
183 David Cole, The Liberal Legacy of Bush v. Gore, 94 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1443
(2006).
184 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004).
185 Cole, supra note 183, at 143-46.
186 In her new book, Jan Crawford Greenburg takes issue with at least a version of
Cole's thesis (which she cites): "[T]he suggestion that O'Connor and Kennedy voted with
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One example that Cole himself cites 187 is McConnell v. FEC, in which
Justice O'Connor joined the four liberals to uphold the constitutionality of
the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform law.188 That result, however,
is perhaps better explained by the strength of the factual record that the law's
supporters developed to show the corrupting effect of soft money on
congressional decisions concerning what laws to enact.189 Once Justice
O'Connor determined that the evidence of corruption was enough to justify
the statute's soft-money regulations, the reluctance to split the new statute in
half-a move made in Buckley v. Valeo 190 that proved counterproductive-
combined with an unwillingness to overrule Austin 19' even if she disagreed
with it, was enough to persuade her to reject the facial challenge to the law's
"electioneering communications" provisions. Even before Bush v. Gore,
moreover, Justice O'Connor had been growing more sympathetic to
campaign finance regulations.' 92 Thus, it is doubtful that the backlash effect
of Bush v. Gore provides much explanation for Justice O'Connor's deference
to Congress in McConnell.'93
Cole's citation to Vieth v. Jubelirer,194 the partisan gerrymandering case,
is more dubious. To be sure, as Cole says, Justice Kennedy did not join the
four conservatives (which in that case included Justice O'Connor) to
the Court's liberals only in the years after Bush v. Gore, in order to counter allegations by
the media and law professors that they had been driven by rank partisanship, ignores a
decade of their earlier rulings on social issues." GREENBURG, supra note 100, at 29-30. I
did not understand Cole's argument to be the night-to-day transformation that Crawford
Greenburg implies with the word "only"; instead, I think, Cole's thesis is that the
O'Connor/Kennedy shift to the left after Bush v. Gore is more nuanced but nonetheless
noticeable.
187 Cole, supra note 183, at 1433, 1436.
188 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
189 Disclosure: I served as a consultant to attorneys representing Senators McCain
and Feingold in their defense of their statute in McConnell v. FEC.
190 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
191 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
192 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
193 Another case that Cole might have cited but did not (it is unclear why) is Easley
v. Cromartie, the 5-4 decision in which Justice O'Connor joins with the four liberals to
reject the claim that the district that North Carolina drew in response to Shaw v. Reno,
509 U.S. 630 (1993), was also an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Easley v.
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001). Like McConnell, however, that decision shows less of
the backlash influence of Bush v. Gore and is attributable more to Justice O'Connor's
intensely fact-specific view of when race receives excessive consideration as a factor in
districting decisions. Once she had set Shaw as a marker, she was willing to uphold a
district that could be justified on political considerations other than race.
194 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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foreclose any chance that a partisan gerrymander might violate Equal
Protection. But he did not rule with the four liberals either in identifying an
Equal Protection principle upon which the claim could go forward.
Moreover, Justice Kennedy's continued fence-sitting on the issue of
partisan gerrymandering, as demonstrated in last year's decision in LULAC v.
Perry,195 is a further indication that he will make up his mind in this
particular area of law based on a careful consideration of the facts and
arguments in each case. His cautious reluctance to police partisan
gerrymandering may reflect a lesson learned from Bush v. Gore: judicial
nullification of a state's election procedures is a tricky matter with potentially
major political repercussions. But that lesson would not be a "liberal legacy"
of Bush v. Gore, but a traditionally conservative one. In any event, Justice
Kennedy's careful tiptoeing in the gerrymander field can be seen as a
reiteration of the step-by-step jurisprudential methodology articulated in
Bush v. Gore: every election case with an Equal Protection claim is distinctly
complicated in its own way and must be judged narrowly on its own specific
facts. Or, as the Court had put it a 1997 case involving the regulation of party
labels on a ballot, 196 which the Court again quoted in Purcell: "[n]o bright
line separates permissible election-related regulation from unconstitutional
infringement."1 97
Two other prominent election law cases since Bush v. Gore cut against
Cole's thesis. In Georgia v. Ashcroft, 198 Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
joined their three conservative colleagues, over the dissent of the four
liberals, to interpret the Voting Rights Act in a way that made it easier for
states to win approval of their redistricting plans. And again in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, 199 these two moderates joined the three
conservatives, much to the dismay of the four liberals, to invalidate a canon
of judicial ethics that barred judicial candidates from announcing their views
on issues they would be likely to rule on as judges. It appears that in each of
these cases-as in McConnell, Vieth, and LULAC-these two Justices were
195 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006).
196 Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
197 Purcell v. Gonzalez, 127 S. Ct. 5, 8 (2006). On one of the Voting Rights Act
issues in LULAC v. Perry, but not another one, Justice Kennedy did join the liberals to
invalidate a specific district on the ground that it diluted Latino voting power. But the
impetus of Justice Kennedy's decision on that issue, as evidenced from his questioning at
oral argument, was his conservative concern, felt strongly, that race was being used as an
inappropriate factor to manipulate several district lines. The liberals who would have
reached the same result on somewhat different grounds pragmatically worked with
Justice Kennedy to reach an opinion on the issue that they all could join.
198 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
199 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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making independent decisions about the merits of specific claims in front of
them, without being influenced by criticism of Bush v. Gore.200
In any event, as Cole himself acknowledges, it is questionable whether
any liberal legacy of Bush v. Gore extends into the Roberts Court era. This is
particularly true once a future President has replaced Justices Stevens and,
possibly, Ginsburg. If that President, for example, were Fred Thompson, it is
likely that the Court would tilt significantly rightward, with little liberal
counterweight stemming from a desire to mollify critics of Bush v. Gore. Of
course, if a Democratic President nominates their replacements, then Justice
Kennedy will stay in the center of the Court, and his position in important
cases unrelated to elections may reflect some ongoing concern that the
Court's institutional reputation be rehabilitated after damage done by Bush v.
Gore. Even so, the ultimate future of the Court's role in constitutional cases
depends much more on who wins the next presidential election than on the
psychological effects of Bush v. Gore on the Court's deliberations.
Whoever wins the White House in 2008, and whichever direction
constitutional law goes as a result, history textbooks presumably will
continue to teach Bush v. Gore as one of the most prominent cases in which
the Court asserted its power. Unlike with Dred Scott201 or Lochner,202 it is
not obvious that the verdict of history will be a strong consensus that Bush v.
200 In a variant of Cole's thesis, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit
(and interviewed by President Bush for a seat on the Supreme Court) has identified a
"split the difference" jurisprudence that developed in the Supreme Court after Bush v.
Gore. Judge Wilkinson further suggests, albeit very tentatively, that "[t]he Court may
have been so shaken by the criticism over Bush v. Gore that it sought to reassure the
country with a display of centrist evenhandedness." J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The
Rehnquist Court at Twilight: The Lures and Perils of Split-the-Difference Jurisprudence,
58 STAN. L. REv. 1969, 1971 (2006). Judge Wilkinson acknowledges, however, that a
split-the-difference mentality was on display prior to Bush v. Gore-most notably, in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey-and an acceleration of this trend after 2000 may have
been caused by other factors, including an increased confidence in this fact-intensive
approach on the part of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy.
Ultimately, I find it hard to believe that these two Justices were more fact-specific in
their one-case-at-a-time approach to constitutional adjudication as a result of criticism of
Bush v. Gore, since the most vehement attack upon the reasoning of that precedent was
its "we're deciding just this case" sentence. Cass Sunstein had identified fact-specific
minimalist reasoning as a hallmark of these two Justices several years before Bush v.
Gore; see his ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT
(1999). It is more likely, therefore, that the "split-the-difference" version of this
methodology surfaced more prominently as use of this methodology matured over time:
each new case worthy of certiorari would likely be one presenting facts in between those
of cases settled previously, on one side or the other. On this view, Bush v. Gore is much
more a product of this methodology than a cause of its increased use.
201 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
202 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Gore was an inappropriate exercise of the Court's power.203 Yet even if that
is the verdict, it seems doubtful that the implication of that judgment will
extend beyond its specific domain: the Court should not exercise jurisdiction
over a case that will determine the presidency when procedures exist, even if
messy ones, for Congress to make this determination. There are enough other
instances of the Court's assertion of power that history has applauded-the
Watergate tapes case204 and the Pentagon Papers case, 20 5 for example-that
the historical lesson of Bush v. Gore will never be a repudiation of the
Court's power in general.20 6
But if the primary historical significance of Bush v. Gore is a judgment
about the Court's need for self-restraint in the special circumstances of
presidential election procedures, then the case will have little lasting impact
upon the future development of constitutional law generally.20 7 To be sure,
as we have seen, there will emerge the specific constitutional doctrine that
defines the scope of the Equal Protection principle invoked in Bush v. Gore,
but that doctrine will develop in elections involving offices other than the
presidency and will remain a rather small subset of Equal Protection law as it
applies to elections. Likewise, there will also develop a procedural
jurisprudence on when courts can insert themselves into the voting process
generally, whether or not the presidency is on the ballot. But although Bush
v. Gore will have contributed to that procedural jurisprudence, its
contributions to that case law will be superseded quickly by more germane
and recent precedents, like Purcell v. Gonzalez. Thus, perhaps ironically,
Bush v. Gore will leave its biggest mark on American law in circumstances
that have nothing to do with the presidency, while in this particular context-
203 Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History,
89 CAL. L. REV. 1721 (2001).
204 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
205 New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
206 Shortly after the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, Cass Sunstein speculated how
the case might be viewed in 2050. He suggested that it would be seen as ushering in an
era of judicial restraint known as "the Quiet Court." What We'll Remember in 2050: 9
Views of Bush v. Gore, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Wash. D.C.), Jan. 5, 2001, at 15
(statement by Cass Sunstein). While we have not yet finished even one decade toward the
mid-century mark, there is already much to suggest that this particular prognostication is
inaccurate: even if the judicial muscle-flexing of Lawrence v. Texas, or Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld-or any of the Court's section 5 or punitive damages decisions-were not a
byproduct of Bush v. Gore, these examples refute the proposition that the Court has been
especially restrained since then. If an accelerating trend towards greater judicial restraint
occurs between now and 2050, it will be because of new appointments to the Court, or
other developments, rather than a general jurisprudential backlash to Bush v. Gore.
207 Klarman, supra note 203, at 1736.
100320071
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
for which it is deemed most significant-it is likely ultimately to prove most
trivial.
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATION
When I had the opportunity to present a version of this Article to a group
of local election officials, it struck me that perhaps its most useful point is the
one that ends Part II: if I am right that, more likely, it will be decades rather
than years before the Supreme Court revisits the Equal Protection precedent
of Bush v. Gore, then the analogy to Bakke may prove apt. The Equal
Protection law of Bush v. Gore will develop a life of its own during those
decades without interference from the Supreme Court itself, and that organic
development may turn out to influence the Court when it eventually does
return to this precedent. Just as Bakke-in-practice for a quarter-century
shaped Justice O'Connor's thinking in Grutter as much as Bakke-in-print, so
too may Bush v. Gore, as developed from one election to the next in the
trenches of voting administration, end up shaping some future "swing
Justice" much more than the sparse words of Bush v. Gore on the page.
In an effort to imagine how election officials themselves will come to use
and thus understand Bush v. Gore, the four-part categorization of potential
Bush v. Gore-based claims (developed in Part II.B) may be illuminating. For
example, will election officials fear (or accept) that local variations caused
by mistaken interpretation of statewide rules violate the Equal Protection
principle of Bush v. Gore, thereby leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy? (As a
result of this self-fulfilling prophecy, the organically developed law of Bush
v. Gore would recognize that discriminatory disenfranchisement caused by
local mistakes is just as unconstitutional as discriminatory
disenfranchisement caused by variations in local interpretations of a vague
statewide rule.) Similarly, will election officials believe that they cannot
defend the constitutionality of local inequalities in voting opportunities
caused by arbitrary, unreasoned exercises of administrative discretion-so
that the well-developed prevailing understanding of Bush v. Gore embraces
the proposition that cases of this kind present valid Equal Protection claims?
Although I developed the four-part taxonomy of potential Bush v. Gore cases
in an effort to discern how the Supreme Court might view these cases,
perhaps distinguishing among them, I see now that there is even greater
practical advantage in attempting to anticipate how election officials might
treat each of these distinct situations. Likewise, it is especially useful to
contemplate how the lower courts will adjudicate these claims for the
presumably long time it takes until the Supreme Court involves itself again
with this topic.
Moreover, the room for local election officials and lower federal courts
to develop their own jurisprudence of Bush v. Gore "in the trenches" results
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from the enormous uncertainty of how the Supreme Court would decide
many of the potential claims that could arise under this precedent. As we
have seen in sub-Parts II.C and II.D, this extreme uncertainty exists whether
we examine the question of what the Supreme Court ideally ought to do in
each of these cases (in a Herculean quest to identify the "right answer" for
each one) or we more realistically consider how the actual Justices
themselves are likely to rule.
In sum, while this Article began with thinking about how the Supreme
Court would determine the law of Bush v. Gore in each of these categories,
the Article ends by suggesting that how the law of Bush v. Gore develops on
its own in each of these four categories may ultimately determine what the
Court itself accepts as the meaning of this remarkable precedent.
POSTSCRIPT
The release of Jeffrey Toobin's much-heralded book The Nine came
shortly after the editing of this Article was complete. Although Toobin's
book contains an extensive (and interesting) discussion of Bush v. Gore, that
discussion--even assuming its accuracy, which I am in no position to either
confirm or refute-does not alter the analysis or conclusions in this Article.
Most significantly, it remains true that it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
will consider a case involving the Equal Protection principle of Bush v. Gore
for many years, long after the composition of the Court has changed (thereby
compounding the many difficulties of predicting how the Court will apply
this Equal Protection principle in the future).
Toobin does describe Justice Kennedy as eager for the Court to grant
review in Bush v. Gore itself. ("His hunger for the case was palpable. '20 8)
But it does not follow that Justice Kennedy, or other Members of the Court,
would be equally eager to grant review to the first new case that would
enable the Court to apply and elucidate the Equal Protection holding of Bush
v. Gore. The old aphorism "once burned, twice shy" suffices to explain this
point. In any event, for the reasons analyzed in Part II.E, there is a complex
set of considerations, including lingering emotions on and off the Court
about Bush v. Gore itself, that will affect when the Court will take a case
requiring it to apply that precedent.
Moreover, as for the merits of any new claim relying on that precedent,
Toobin's book does not change the calculus concerning the factors that may
affect the scope of the Equal Protection principle, as it develops over time
from one case to another in a path-dependent way. Toobin's account
confirms that Justice Kennedy will want the Equal Protection holding of
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Bush v. Gore to appear principled whenever it becomes applied to a future
fact pattern. ("The Equal Protection Clause suited Kennedy's romantic
conception of the work of the Supreme Court. '20 9) Likewise, Toobin offers
no reason to think that any of the current so-called "liberals" on the Court-
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-would reject invoking the
Equal Protection principle of Bush v. Gore in a case involving discriminatory
disenfranchisement that they considered unfair and requiring a remedy. Even
Toobin's description of Justice Souter as crying (and almost resigning) over
the outcome of Bush v. Gore, an account which has been questioned by
others, does not negate this observation. Justice Souter's objection, as I
discuss in Part II.D.2, concerned the Court's decision to intervene and halt
the Florida recount in 2000, not the merits of the majority's Equal Protection
principle. In different procedural circumstances, Justice Souter might well be
among the first to insist on evenhanded treatment of the electorate regarding
the counting of votes. In any event, to reiterate, for reasons entirely unrelated
to Bush v. Gore, Justice Souter (like others among his current colleagues)
may no longer be on the Court when it comes time to give shape to that
controversial precedent.
Finally, as anticipated in this Article, the future meaning of Bush v. Gore
will be shaped by collateral developments concerning the Equal Protection
Clause's applicability to issues of voting administration, including the voter
identification question that the Supreme Court has agreed to hear.210
Although this voter identification question does not itself directly implicate
the specific Bush v. Gore principle (for reasons I have elaborated in this
Article21 1), and although the Court's voter identification opinion may not cite
Bush v. Gore, this new opinion-whichever way it rules-may affect the
Court's future understanding of the scope of Bush v. Gore itself, whenever
the Court does decide a case that directly implicates that precedent (in other
words, one of the kinds described in the taxonomical account in Part II.B). In
this way, the recent grant of certiorari in the Indiana voter identification
litigation underscores one of the primary observations of this Article: path-
dependency is not merely internal to the cases within the direct ambit of Bush
v. Gore, involving discriminatory treatment of voters as a result of local
variations; rather, path-dependency encompasses adjacent fields of Equal
Protection law concerning the operation of elections, thus exacerbating the
problems of predicting the future of Bush v. Gore.
209 Id. at 172.
210 Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), cert
granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2007) (No. 07-21); Ind. Democratic Party v.
Rokita, 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007), cert granted, 76 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Sept. 25,
2007) (No. 07-25).
211 See, supra, text accompanying notes 126-29.
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